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Abstract 
 
Under the compressed wage structure and generous family policies, Nordic countries have 
been regarded as leaders of gender equality in terms of low gender pay gaps and high rates of 
female labor force participation; after the fundamental restructuring of the economic system in 
Eastern European countries, women have experienced a remarkable change with respect to the 
labor market positions and economic status facing the increased wage inequality and 
significant declines in labor force participation rates. The cross-country comparison of gender 
pay gaps is investigated using ESS2 (European Social Survey second round) data sets and 
econometric techniques for the selected Nordic countries and Eastern European countries. The 
results indicate the different characteristics in terms of the gender pay gaps and labor market 
situations in these countries. Some significant difference in gender pay gaps between 
countries has been found; however, the systematic pattern of significant difference in gender 
pay gaps between the two groups of countries does not exist. Besides, the negative correlation 
between gender wage gaps and female employment rates cannot be strongly supported by the 
evidence in this study and the positive relation between the wage distributions and the gender 
wage gaps can only be applied to the adjusted wage gaps between single men and women. 
The gender pay gaps in Nordic countries remain low level, but the negative effects of family-
friendly policies and over-crowded public sector may have led to the relatively high family 
wage gaps in these countries. On the other hand, modest increases in wage inequality and the 
improved rewards to skills in the competitive markets which favor women employed in the 
labor markets perhaps keep the gender pay gaps modest level in the selected Eastern European 
countries. In addition, unexplained factors still account for a non-negligible proportion in 
gender pay gaps, which raises the consideration about the discrimination against women in the 
labor market among all the selected countries. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The difference in earnings between men and women has a long history, and nowadays, this 
disparity in earnings still exists in almost every occupation and in every country throughout 
the world. Such kind of disparity is called gender pay gap in this study, which is defined as 
the difference in mean logarithm of gross hourly earnings between male and female paid 
employees aged 15-64 whose main activities are paid work during the last seven days before 
the survey date across the whole economy.  
 
The gender pay gap has been studied by using many different data sets and estimation 
methods for several countries and those findings do explain a lot about the reasons and 
characteristics of the pay gap. Most studies concentrate on examining the pay gap within a 
specific country, while relatively little attention has been paid to a comparative study across 
countries (Polachek and Xiang, 2006). But actually, as Polachek and Xiang (2006) pointed out, 
there are considerable international variations in the gender wage gap. For example, among 
OECD nations, women in Australia, Belgium, Italy and Sweden earn 80 percent as much as 
males, whereas in Austria, Canada and Japan women earn about 60 percent as much as males. 
Thus, it is possible to expect some important knowledge and findings by engaging in a 
comparative study of gender pay gaps across countries. 
 
This thesis compares the gender pay gaps in Nordic countries with those in Eastern European 
countries. Nordic countries have been regarded as leaders with respect to large degree gender 
equality in the labor market, but the process of stagnation can also be seen in the gender wage 
gaps in most of these countries in recent years (Datta Gupta et al. 2006); and Eastern 
European countries have experienced a fundamental restructuring of their economic system 
toward a market economy since the begin of the 1990s, increases in wage inequality and 
significant declines in labor force participation rates have depressed female relative wages 
(Brainerd, 2000). The studies which are relevant to the gender pay gap are not very well 
documented in Eastern Europe (Paternostro and Sahn, 1999),  it is worth noting the 
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characteristics of the gender pay gaps in the economies in or after transition1 and comparing 
with those characteristics in the countries with traditionally low level of gender inequality.  
 
In this study, ESS2 (European Social Survey second round) data sets have been utilized to 
explore the variations in the gender pay gaps between the selected Nordic countries and 
Eastern European countries during the period 2004-2005. Nordic countries comprise Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden; while Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and 
Ukraine are selected from the Eastern European countries. An integrated statistical package 
‘STATA’ (version 9.0) has been mainly used for data analysis and graphics. The hypotheses 
are concentrated on the cross-country comparison of gender pay gaps. More specifically, 
whether the gender pay gaps in Nordic countries are significantly different from those in 
Eastern European countries and what are the inherent factors which contribute to such pay 
gaps in different countries? Do the gender wage gaps positively correlate with the wage 
distributions in these countries? Is there any negative relation between gender wage 
differentials and female employment rates in the labor markets in these two types of countries 
with different labor market characteristics and policies?  
 
The analysis follows the established econometric techniques of estimating the earnings 
equation, decomposing the gender pay gaps and hypothesis testing across countries. Several 
findings are provided by this study. First, some significant difference in gender pay gaps has 
exhibited between the selected Nordic countries and Eastern European countries, but such 
pattern cannot be found between the two groups of countries. Second, a more compressed 
wage structure associated with a lower gender wage gap can only be applied to the adjusted 
gender wage gaps between single men and women in the sample countries in this study. Third, 
the negative correlation between gender pay gaps and the female employment rates cannot be 
strongly proved in these countries, although a weakly negative correlation between the male-
female wage differentials for single individuals and the single female employment rates has 
shown up. Finally, that the family wage gaps which are prevalent in Nordic countries and not 
notable in Eastern Europe can perhaps explain the above three findings to some extent.   
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief discussion of background 
for this study and some related findings of cross-country gender pay gap. Section 3 describes 
                                                
1
 According to the World Bank “10 years of transition” report, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
which joined the EU on 1.May 2004 have completed the transition process. 
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the data sets and the methodology used in analyzing the data is presented in section 4. Section 
5 brings the main results and empirical evidence. Some underlying reasons for the findings 
will be discussed in section 6. The last section concludes the thesis. 
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2.  Background and Related Findings 
 
Previous comparative studies of gender pay gap have brought some inspiration for this thesis.  
Rosenfeld and Kalleberg (1990) carried out the standard wage regressions for full-time 
workers to compare the wage differences between men and women in two sets of 
countries(United States and Canada; Norway and Sweden) with different labor market 
structures, and they found significant unexplained wage differences in each country. The 
finding from Blau and Kahn (1996b) is the more compressed the wage structure the smaller 
the gender wage gap. Less dispersed wage structures, however, are not always favorable to 
women. As mentioned in OECD Employment Outlook (2002), a narrow-than-average wage 
differential between the private and the public sector in Belgium, Denmark, Finland and the 
Netherlands contributes to a widening of the gender wage gap in these countries since women 
are over-represented in the public sector in these countries. Regarding the relationship 
between the female employment rate and the gender wage gap across countries, OECD 
Employment Outlook (2002) pointed out that with an evidence that cross-country differences 
in female employment rates are mainly accounted for by the degree of integration of less 
educated and lower-paid women into employment, in countries where a higher proportion of 
low-educated women are employed, the gender pay gap will tend to be wider, all other things 
being equal. 
2.1 Gender Pay Gaps in Nordic Countries 
 
Scandinavian women were among the first to get equal pay by law around the world (Datta 
Gupta et al. 2006) and Nordic countries do have succeeded in achieving high level of gender 
equality such as the high female labor force participation rate and the low gender wage gap. 
The observed unadjusted mean female-male earnings ratios in Nordic countries were between 
80% and 88% in 19962, which remained among the highest in the world. This might be the 
case which suggested by Blau and Kahn (1996b) that a more compressed wage structure was 
associated with a lower gender pay gap, since the Nordic countries have a compressed wage 
                                                
2
 The actual gap depends on whether the wage measure is straight time wages or includes leave pay. See 
Pedersen and Deding (2000). 
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dispersion due to a “solidaric wage policy” (see Longva and Strøm,1996). But on the other 
hand, there has been almost no movement in the high ratio in Denmark since the late 1970s 
(Rosholm and Smith, 1996), and even a slight decrease there in recent years (Datta Gupta et 
al., 2006); Sweden has experienced the same process of stagnation in the gender wage gap 
since the start of the 1980s (Edin and Richardson, 2002), and so does Finland; only Norway 
had a steady decline in its gender wage gap in the 1980s and 1990s (Asplund et al., 1997). The 
stagnant process in the gender pay gaps in most of the Nordic countries is exactly different 
from the case in some other countries who are on the way towards narrowing the gender pay 
gap, such as the U.S., whose average female-male raw earnings ratio showed considerable 
progress after 1970s (Datta Gupta et al. 2006).  
 
Several explanations for such kind of stagnation in Nordic countries can be found from other 
empirical studies. Mainly, one is the gender segregation by sector which states that lower pay 
can result from over-supply of female workers in a certain working sector. As mentioned 
before, over-representation of women in the public sector in Denmark and Finland has a 
positive contribution to a widening of the gender wage gap (OECD, 2002).  The other 
argument is the ‘boomerang’ effects of family-friendly policies in Nordic countries (Datta 
Gupta et al. 2006) with the purpose of pursuing gender equality in the labor market. Nordic 
countries led on most of the family-friendly policy indices (OECD, 2001) and have succeeded 
in maintaining a high rate of female employment. One of the ‘boomerang’ effects which 
should be considered in this thesis is that the nice family-friendly schemes mostly taken by 
mothers may deteriorate women’s position in the labor market and thus negatively affect the 
pay received by women. For instance, Ruhm (1998) found that the extensions of parental 
leave schemes in OECD countries tend to increase the gender wage gap. 
  
Family wage gap is another focus of some studies based on the stylized facts that male-female 
wage differences are relatively small for single men and women, but considerably larger for 
married men and women especially those with children (Blau and Kahn, 1992; Harkness and 
Waldfogel, 2003). Polachek (1975) and Becker (1985) showed the result that married men had 
higher wages since they invested more human capital than married women (especially those 
married women with children), while single men and women earned roughly similar wages. 
Given the generous family-friendly policies in Nordic countries may bring some negative 
effects on women’s commitment to their careers and incentive to accumulate more human 
capital during the interruption of their careers due to childcare and parental leave, the 
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difference in the pay gap between single men and women and that between married men and 
women might be expected by adopting the family wage gap approach in this study.  
2.2  Women’s Economic Status in Eastern Europe 
 
A transition economy is defined as an economy which is changing from a planned economy to 
a free market in this study. Eastern European countries introduced the market reform in the 
early 1990s and have experienced more than a decade for the transition process. An important 
feature of transition economy is the economic liberalization accompanied by growing social 
inequality and the dismantled state welfare systems. 
 
As for the labor market, women in Eastern Europe fared relatively well under socialism 
(Brainerd, 2000) due to the centralized wage-setting system and the government’s 
commitment to equality. Given the similar economic structure and labor market institutions in 
these countries before transition, the women’s economic status like high female labor force 
participation rates and modest female-male wage differentials was also similar among these 
countries. Economic reforms have been implemented in these countries at different paces 
since the 1990s, and the change in women’s economic status goes to different ways. Refering 
to the research of Brainerd (2000), women in Ukraine is faring substantially worse in terms of 
wages relative to men than they did under socialism, whereas women in some other 
countries—such as Poland and Hungary—have gained significantly in comparison with men 
since the introduction of reform.  
 
Changes in the wage structure and in the gender-specific factors such as discrimination appear 
to be related to the change in labor market experiences. On the one hand, centralized wage-
setting system has been abandoned since market reform was adopted, both labor price and 
inequality have been risen in these countries (though at different speed), female-male wage 
differentials can be expected to rise even though women may benefit from an increased rate of 
return to human capital if women are on average well-educated. On the other hand, reform is 
supposed to create more effective and competitive labor market, thus the factors which can 
enlarge the gender pay gap such as the discrimination against women in the labor market are 
predictably diminishing as the transition process goes to the end. This is consistent with one 
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implication of Becker’s model3 that competitive market forces will cause discrimination to 
diminish and disappear over time because the lower-cost non-discriminating firms can gain a 
larger share of the market at the expense of less-efficient discriminating firms. 
 
Empirical studies (e.g. Brainerd, 2000) showed that women in Ukraine suffered a substantial 
decline in relative wages by the tremendous widening of the wage distribution after the 
market reform has been performed; modest increases in wage inequality in some other 
countries such as Poland and Hungary have also depressed female relative wages, but these 
losses have been offset by gains in remuneration to observed skills and by a decline in 
discrimination against women. Female labor force participation rates have fallen significantly 
in all Eastern European countries but have been matched by similar declines in male labor 
force participation rates. 
 
Given the experiences of Eastern European countries and the available ESS2 data sets, this 
thesis will focus on the labor market situations and women’s economic status in these 
countries in the survey year 2004- 2005 and the contrast of gender pay gaps between Eastern 
Europe and Nordic countries. The pre-reform female labor market performance may be 
mentioned in some parts, but the investigation of the differences in this kind of performance 
before and after the market reform will be beyond the scope of this thesis.    
                                                
3
 Becker’s taste-for-discrimination model gives the interpretation that the discriminating firms can not survive in 
a highly competitive product market. See Mcconnell et al.(2003). 
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3.  Data 
 
This study utilizes the data sets from European Social Survey second round (ESS2), which is 
a multi-country survey covering 25 European Nations and fielding in year 2004 and 2005. 
Four restricted conditions are considered here for the purpose of this study: 
a). The target countries have been selected from the data sets following the definition of 
United Nations Statistics Division, five Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden; five Eastern European countries, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
and Ukraine. 
b). Due to data limitation, data sets in 2004 are relatively complete for most of the target 
countries, but not available for Iceland, Hungary and Ukraine. So the data sets in 2005 are 
used for Iceland, Hungary and Ukraine in this study; and for the other seven countries the data 
sets in 2004 are used. The explanation for this choice is that the labor market situation such as 
the characteristics of the individuals and firms as well as the institutional arrangements such 
as the wage formation and policies has no dramatic changes in terms of the effect on the main 
conclusions. 
c). The population consists of individuals in the ten target countries between age 14 and age 
99, and the target samples are restricted to the working age paid employees. Working age is 
generally defined as persons in the 15 to 64 age bracket according to the ILO Guidelines (see 
OECD Factbook 2007), which is also consistent with the fact that the current retirement age in 
Nordic countries is age 65 on average and in Eastern European countries is age 60 on average. 
Employed workers are defined as those hold paid work as the main activity during the last 
seven days before the survey date in ESS2, where full-time students and self-employed 
persons are excluded. The target sample frame including only the paid employees is for the 
sake of the statistical consistence concerning the topic of this thesis.  
d). Variables. The questionnaire in ESS2 includes two main sections and each consists of 
approximately 120 items, which aims to monitor the cross-country differences in a wide range 
of social variables. In order to compare gender pay gaps across countries, the explanatory 
variables are chosen in terms of gender, age, education, experience, marital status, working 
sector and so on. The dependent variable in this study is the natural logarithm of hourly wage. 
One problem here is that the lack of information on working sector variables for the samples 
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in Hungary.  Summary of variable definitions is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
The wage concept used throughout the analysis is the gross hourly wage, which is given by 
the gross pay in Euro before tax and insurance deduction during a certain period divided by 
the contracted working hours during the same period in main job for each individual. Since 
women averagely work fewer hours per year than men do, comparing hourly wage between 
men and women is likely to avoid the over-estimation of gender pay gap in each country. 
 
One advantage of the data sets is that they cover several Eastern European countries as well as 
all Nordic countries. One problem for the gender pay gap research concerning Eastern 
European countries is data limitation. Given the data sets from ESS2, it is likely to get some 
ideas about the gender wage differentials in those transition economies and make cross-
country comparison as well. 
 
It is necessary to mention that the “design weight” has been involved in computing data. 
Several of the sample designs used by countries participating in the ESS were not able to give 
all individuals in the population exactly the same chance of selection, it means that  the 
selection bias maybe exist in the data due to the non-random sample selection. By using the 
“design weight”, it is possible to correct the problem of selection such as over- or under-
represent certain types of people in samples in some countries, and make the samples more 
representative of the population in each country. 
 
Means of the variables on full sample for each country and means of the variables on age 15-
64 paid employees for each country are given in Appendix 2a /2b and Appendix 3a/3b, 
respectively, which provide the detailed information about the samples in this study. The 
discussion and analysis will be in the later section, and here it should be noted that the main 
disadvantage of the data sets is the relatively small sample size. Especially, when they are 
restricted to the target samples, say aged 15-64 paid employees, only around 800 observations 
on average in Nordic countries except in Iceland (which has less than 200 observations), while 
around 450 observations on average in Eastern European countries except in Slovakia (which 
has only 320). The difficulties in obtaining highly reliable estimates for statistical models 
probably arise because of the small sample sizes. 
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4.  Methodology 
4.1 Wage Equation and Decomposition 
 
To gauge the magnitude of the effects of the labor market characteristics on gender pay gap, 
the Mincer earnings equation (1974) in which the logarithm of hourly wage is explained by a 
set of factors such as personal characteristics and job characteristics is applied in this thesis. 
The wage equation, for the target individuals (age 15-64 paid employees), takes the form: 
 
                ( ) εδδδϕβα +×+++++= MFMFSXW 321log   
 
where W  denotes the hourly wage for each individual, and the natural logarithm of hourly 
wage is taken as the dependent variable in this equation. X is a vector of human-capital 
variables, and S is a vector of working sector dummy variables. F and M are both 
demographic dummy variables, which indicate the gender and marital status, respectively. An 
important interaction term (F×M) is used here to facilitate the comparison of the gender pay 
gaps among individuals with different marital status. 21 ,,,, δδϕβα  and 3δ are vectors of 
unknown coefficients, while ε  is a stochastic error term assumed to be normally distributed 
with zero expectation.  
 
 X vector includes a set of human capital variables like years of education, years of labor 
market experience, and a quadratic term of experience. S vector consists of the manufacturing 
and public dummy variables, which can be either a manufacturing worker or a public sector 
employee. Presenting these vectors to the wage equation is because the differences in the 
stock of human capital and the dominant occupations between men and women are perhaps 
the sources of the female-male earnings differential to some extent (see Mcconnell et al. 2003). 
 
Based on an OLS regression of the wage equation and individual data, wage functions for 
aged 15 to 64 paid employees can be estimated. Clearly, 1ˆδ  is the estimated wage differential 
between men and women for the sample individuals, which results from the individual 
membership in the female group. As shown in Blau and Kahn (1992), and Harkness and 
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Waldfogel (2003), male-female wage differences are relatively small (usually less than 10%) 
for single (especially never married) men and women; but these differences are considerably 
larger (roughly 40%) for married men and women, especially those with children. So in this 
study, the interaction term (F×M) which combines the gender and marital status dummy 
variables has been introduced into wage equation. Briefly, 1ˆδ indicates the pay gap between 
single male and female; and the pay gap between married male and female can be shown by 
( 31 ˆˆ δδ + ). Given these estimates, it is plausible to find out whether the marital status has a 
significant effect on gender pay gap in each country, how large the effect is, and further 
explore the probable reasons of such effect. 
 
This wage equation is often extended to include more variables such as region, union density 
and so on, in order to find more factors which can explain the gender wage differential. The 
coefficient of gender dummy variable, as mentioned before, can measure the unexplained 
factor of the female wage deficiency. So this method can be used to explain the gender wage 
gap based on a host of variables which are linked to the observable labor market 
characteristics on the one hand, and on the other to the unclear reasons due to the individual 
membership in the female group. It allows us to identify whether those possible sources of 
pay inequality between men and women can be significantly observed components of the 
gender pay gap, and obtain the adjusted gender pay gap when the differences in the observed 
components like human capital endowments and productive characteristics are taken into 
account.  By applying this method, it is possible to figure out some characteristics which play 
important roles in the emergence of the gender pay gaps in different countries; and to compare 
the adjusted wage gap as well as the unadjusted gap among countries. 
 
Furthermore, the technique so-called decomposition of the gender pay gap has been taken for 
the sake of specifying more detailed magnitude of different components’ contribution to the 
pay differential. According to the research of gender pay gap measurements which is 
conducted by Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003), Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
appears to be one of the most common methods in explaining gender pay gap, apart from 
Mincer earnings equation. Blinder(1973) and Oaxaca(1973) first propose a technique to use 
the estimating wage equations separately for men and women, then decompose the observed 
gender pay gap into two parts, say, explained component (such as difference in skills) and 
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unexplained component (such as discrimination); this decomposition is under the assumption 
that employers value similar endowed skills of men and women differently. 
 
Based on the wage equation utilized in this study, a decomposition technique which crucially 
assuming that male and female have the same returns to personal characteristics has been used 
here. More specifically, the unadjusted wage differential: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) FFMFMFMFM MMMSSXXWW ×−−+−−+−=− 321 ˆˆˆˆˆloglog δδδϕβ , 
 
where MX  and FX  represent the mean value of  the human-capital vector of men and women 
respectively, βˆ  is the estimated value of returns to human capital  from the wage function 
regressions, which is supposed to be same for both men and women. Analogically, MS  and 
FS  are the proportion of men and women in a certain working sector, MM  and FM  are the 
proportion of getting married for men and women; while ϕˆ  and 2ˆδ  are the remunerations for 
the persons in that working sector and those get married, respectively. Besides, 1ˆδ  indicates 
the penalty on earnings due to being a woman, and 3ˆδ gives the penalty on earnings for a 
married woman. In a word, the difference in the mean log hourly wage between male and 
female can be decomposed into “explained components” and “unexplained components” in 
this case, in which the “explained components” consist of the differences in human capital 
endowments between men and women weighed by the rates of return to human capital (the 
first term on the right-hand side), the differences in sectoral composition weighed by the 
premium to the worker in a certain working sector (the second term), and the differences in 
proportion of getting married weighed by the remuneration to the married people (the fourth 
term); while the “unexplained components” comprise the rates of penalty to women (the third 
term on the right-hand side) and the proportion of married women weighed by the rates of 
penalty to married women. 
 
The decomposition adopted here is to find out the exact percentage of each component on the 
contribution to gender pay gap in each country, thus the size regarding the different 
components’ contribution in different countries will be netted out. It enables to specify the 
proportion of significant components of pay gap in each country and assess such cross-
country differentials.   
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4.2 Hypothesis Test for Cross-country Difference in Pay Gaps 
 
The hypothesis with respect to the cross-country difference in gender pay gaps involves 
comparing the gender pay gaps between Nordic countries and Eastern European countries, so 
this section summarizes how to test this hypothesis. 
 
Let Nγ  be the mean gender pay gap in one of the Nordic countries and let Eγ  be the mean 
gender pay gap in one of the Eastern European countries. Since Nγ  and Eγ  are constructed 
from different randomly selected samples, both of them are independent random variables. 
The mean gender pay gap in each country is FM WW loglog −=γ , and the difference in the 
gender pay gaps between each Nordic country and each Eastern European country is specified 
by ( EN γγ − ). Follow the wage equation mentioned before, if there is a significant difference 
in the gender pay gap between single individuals and married individuals in one country, then 
1δγ = for the pay gap between single men and women as well as 31 δδγ +=  for the pay gap 
between married men and women can be expected.  
 
Considering the hypothesis that whether gender pay gaps in Nordic countries significantly 
differ from those in Eastern European countries, the two-sided alternative hypothesis is 
                          0:0 =− ENH γγ   vs.   0:1 ≠− ENH γγ . 
If the null hypothesis ( )0H  that gender pay gaps are of no difference between the Nordic 
countries and Eastern European countries can be rejected at the statistically significant level, it 
means the cross-country difference in gender pay gaps is statistically significant.  
 
In order to test the null hypothesis, the t-statistic for comparing two means from different 
populations is carried out here, 
                         
22
EN
EN
SeSe
t
+
−
=
γγ
 
in which NSe and ESe designate the standard error of  the mean gender pay gap Nγ  and Eγ , 
respectively.  
 
In this hypothesis test for cross-country difference in gender pay gaps, t-statistic can be simply 
calculated with the estimated gender pay gaps and standard errors of the gaps in different 
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countries and compared with an appropriate critical value, then whether to reject the null 
hypothesis can be decided. Besides, it is deserved to mention that this thesis only compares 
the difference in gender pay gaps between each individual Nordic country and each individual 
Eastern European country. Though it can be expected even within the same country group, the 
gender pay gap in each individual country could have various characteristics and maybe 
significant difference, the test between countries within the same group will not be conducted 
since it is not the main domain of this study. 
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5.  Results and Analysis 
5.1 Descriptive Evidence 
 
5.1.1 Variable Means 
 
Means of the variables for the full sample and aged 15-64 paid employees are listed in 
Appendix 2a/2b and 3a/3b, respectively. From the means for the full sample, on average, there 
are no big differences in demographic and human capital variables between male and female 
in both sets of countries, except a great disparity in the percentage of married population 
between men and women in Hungary and Ukraine. In each country it seems more men stay in 
manufacturing than women, whereas the opposite situation appears in the public sector; and 
these differences are much more marked in Nordic countries rather than in Eastern European 
countries.  
 
Variable means for aged 15-64 paid employees, which should be given more attention in this 
thesis, have shown the similar patterns compared with the full sample means. For the target 
group of aged 15-64 paid employees, the mean age of the samples in Nordic countries is 
above that in Eastern European countries, which is relevant to the fact that the current 
retirement age in Eastern Europe is about five years earlier on average than that in Nordic 
countries. The married proportion of men is close to that of women in most of these countries, 
and the proportion is relatively higher in Eastern Europe than it is in Nordic countries. But 
two things should be noticed here. One is the difference in percentage between married men 
and married women is still huge in Hungary (12.28%) and Ukraine (10.03%) among Eastern 
European countries, which seems unrealistic and is likely to be a disturbance for data 
analysis4; the other is the proportion of married population in Sweden (less than 50% of the 
                                                
4
 As checked for Hungary, if omit the criterion of paid employees and only consider the 15-64 age group in the 
population, the married proportion is 57.68% for men and 53.55% for women, which seems more reliable. Thus, 
many missing data of hourly wages for married women in Hungary may be a possible reason for the huge 
difference in married proportion between male and female paid employees. 
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population) appears much lower than the average level in other countries, perhaps it should be 
treated very cautiously for analyzing the results5.  
 
As for the human capital variables, the gender differences in educational attainment are small 
and actually in most of the countries, women outdo men in their education level. Especially in 
Poland, women have obtained schooling almost one year more than men, averagely. Women 
have no longer been inferior to men regarding to the work experience since it is evident that 
women have more experience (ranging from a low of 0.275 year in Ukraine to a high of 3.962 
years in Iceland) in all the countries except in Czech (but only 0.168 year less than men’s). 
From the data sets in this thesis, women are endowed with higher level of human capital in all 
the countries, and this level has little difference between Nordic and Eastern European 
countries. The reasons behind are perhaps because women in Nordic countries have enjoyed 
equal opportunity for a relatively long time whereas women in Eastern Europe are generally 
better educated than men since the socialism policies before market economy promised 
gender equality in these countries and encouraged women’s education for political and 
economic purposes.  
 
The prominent difference in the variable means between these two sets of countries exists in 
the working sector variables. More men work in manufacturing and more women occupy the 
public sector, which is a common feature in all the countries. The compositions of men and 
women in each sector, however, have substantial differences in these countries. Only a very 
small number of women works in manufacturing in Nordic countries, while though the 
proportion of women working there is lower than that of men in Eastern European countries, 
the difference is not as great as that in Nordic countries. On the other hand, more than half of 
the female population is concentrated in the public sector in Nordic countries, in contrast with 
approximately one-third in Eastern European countries. The problem of over-representation of 
women in a certain working sector seems more striking in Nordic countries, which is 
supposed to depress the wage for women in this sector.  
 
Means of log hourly wage and hourly wage which indicate the raw wage gap between male 
and female will be interpreted later together with the wage equation estimations.   
                                                
5
 As mentioned in previous section, other empirical studies found that male-female wage differences were 
smaller for single men and women but larger for married men and women. If it’s also tenable in the dada sets 
here, the much lower proportion of married workers in the samples compared with other countries can narrow the 
total male-female wage gap in Sweden.     
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5.1.2 Wage Distribution and Inequality 
 
To shed some light on the impact of overall wage structure on the gender pay gap, Table 5-1 
summarizes the wage inequality of the population in sample countries. 
 
Table 5-1   Summary Measures of the Log Wage Distribution 
(Age 15-64) 
 
Variance of log wages  90-10 log wage differential* 
 
Total Male Female  Total OECD data Male Female 
DK(Denmark) 0.319 0.340 0.287  0.848 - 0.897 0.725 
FI(Finland) 0.162 0.169 0.127  1.045 0.880 1.025 0.896 
NO(Norway) 0.138 0.137 0.115  0.793 0.708 0.842 0.708 
SE(Sweden) 0.094 0.101 0.073  0.761 0.833 0.802 0.655 
IS(Iceland)# 0.212 0.215 0.191  1.152 - 1.075 1.064 
CZ(Czech) 0.165 0.167 0.136  1.071 - 0.968 0.970 
PL(Poland) 0.326 0.298 0.352  1.353 - 1.312 1.415 
SK(Slovakia) 0.187 0.174 0.149  1.095 - 1.073 0.896 
HU(Hungary)# 0.306 0.329 0.283  1.418 1.593 1.361 1.335 
UA(Ukraine)# 0.459 0.415 0.491  1.429 - 1.581 1.427 
United States - - -  - 1.535 - - 
[Note] 1.Data from Year 2004; # Data from Year 2005; 
2. * The log wage at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution minus the log wage at the 10th percentile of the 
distribution; 
3.OECD data source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/3/34846881.pdf; 
4.OECD data is for Year 2000-2001, taking natural logarithm of 90-10 percentile ratios for the gross earnings of 
full-time employees. 
 
As shown in the table, the wage structure seems more compressed in Nordic countries since 
most of the Eastern European countries have a larger wage inequality as measured by the 
variance of log wages and the 90-10 log wage differential. Some main points about the level 
of wage inequality have been indicated by observing the 90-10 log wage differential. First, the 
level of male wage inequality is higher than that of female wage inequality in most of these 
countries except in Poland and Czech, which can be seen from the larger numbers in the 
column labeled “Male”; the wage inequality for women is much larger than that for men 
(0.103 log points more) in Poland, while it is subtly different between women and men (only 
0.002 log points) in Czech. Then, the total 90-10 log wage differential is much smaller in 
Nordic countries than that in Eastern Europe with the exception of Iceland whose inequality 
level appears to be greater than that observed in Czech and Slovakia. Next, OECD statistical 
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data has been used as reference in this table, which can be noted that the result computed from 
ESS2 data sets for the wage inequality indication is fairly close to OECD statistical value in 
year 2000-2001, only a dramatic increase in wage dispersion in Finland in 2004. Finally, 
compared with the United States, which has one of the most unequal wage distributions of 
developed countries, most of the sample countries here (except Hungary) have relatively 
lower wage inequality level even though those Eastern European countries have experienced 
the market reform which tends to expand the wage dispersion. 
 
Why such kind of mixed pattern for wage inequality exists in Nordic countries and Eastern 
European countries? Briefly, a possible reason is that it is affected by the characteristics of 
labor market institutions that have evolved in these countries. The outstanding features of the 
Scandinavian labor markets such as centralized bargaining structure, high union participation 
rates, and notable “solidaristic wage policy”6 perhaps contribute to the more compressed wage 
structure and lower level of wage inequality in Nordic countries. The widening wage structure 
in Eastern Europe compared to pre-reform situation is derived from the abandoning of the 
centralized wage-setting system, which leads to the relatively higher level of wage inequality 
in these countries compared with Nordic countries. Nevertheless, most of the Eastern 
European countries still keep a modest wage inequality level7, which is partly owing to the 
establishment of collective bargaining arrangement (except in Ukraine and Poland) and the 
maintaining of minimum wage system in those countries.      
5.2 Estimation Results 
 
Based on the wage equation suggested before, regressions of log hourly wage have been run 
for each country by controlling different related variables. Detailed regression models and 
results are presented in Appendix 4a/4b. Generally, model (1) test the effect of gender dummy 
variable on mean log hourly wage, and the unadjusted gender pay gap can be obtained directly 
from the coefficient of the gender dummy. From model (2) to (4), more and more specific 
variables in relation to the human-capital, marriage, working sectors and the interaction term 
                                                
6
 The concept of solidaristic wage policy as it was developed by the European trade unions in the post-war period 
can be understood as an integrative approach connecting both moral economy and political economy of wage 
formation. The core importance of solidaristic wage policy lies in the principle of de-commodification, according 
to which the price of labor is not set by supply and demand, but instead by collective agreements. From the 
perspective of trade unions, solidaristic wage policy includes both normative and economic objectives (Schulten, 
2004). 
7
 Some of them have at least similar level as in other developed countries and most of them keep lower level than 
that in the United States, referring to OECD data. (see OECD employment outlook 2004, chapter 3). 
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have been added into the regression model with the aim to get better estimation for each 
country. Model (5) which has shown up in some countries is run for the purpose to re-test the 
significant variables and make more convincing selection.  By applying the general method of 
regression selection (adjusted R-square and t-statistic values), different estimation models 
with different explanatory variables have been employed for different countries. Denmark and 
Ukraine will be omitted in the rest of the discussion in this study because of the extremely low 
values of adjusted R-square in all those regressions in these two countries. Table 5-2a and 5-
2b list the selected estimation results for all other countries. 
 
Table 5-2a  Regression Results on log Hourly Wage, Nordic Countries, Age 15-64 
(t statistics in Parentheses) 
 FI(Finland) NO(Norway) SE(Sweden) IS(Iceland)# 
Gender Dummy 
-0.219*** 
(-5.90) 
 
-0.140*** 
(-4.13) 
 
-0.100*** 
(-4.07) 
 
-0.252*** 
(-4.25) 
 
Education 
0.061*** 
(15.35) 
 
0.053*** 
(14.74) 
 
0.055*** 
(16.29) 
 
0.048*** 
(6.12) 
 
Experience 
0.016*** 
(4.23) 
 
0.028*** 
(7.89) 
 
0.016*** 
(5.63) 
 
0.014* 
(1.70) 
 
Experience Sq. 
-0.000140* 
(-1.69) 
 
-0.000433*** 
(-5.95) 
 
-0.000195*** 
(-3.31) 
 
-0.000154 
(-0.86) 
 
Married Dummy 
0.102*** 
(2.80) 
 
0.061** 
(1.97) 
 
0.107*** 
(4.27) 
 
- 
 
Manufacturing Dummy 
0.115*** 
(3.79) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.260** 
(-2.53) 
 
Public Dummy -  
-0.124*** 
(-5.12) 
 
-0.117*** 
(-5.70) 
 
- 
 
F×M 
-0.095** 
(-2.00) 
 
-0.075* 
(-1.76) 
 
-0.117*** 
(-3.41) 
 
- 
 
Intercept 
1.544*** 
(21.49) 
 
2.025*** 
(32.38) 
 
1.794*** 
(32.63) 
 
2.253*** 
(15.43) 
 
Observations 768 
 
857 
 
843 
 
198 
 
Adj.R-square 0.3518 
 
0.3334 
 
0.3428 
 
0.2324 
 
[Note] 1. Data from Year 2004; # Data from Year 2005; 
            2. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5-2b Regression Results on log Hourly Wage, Eastern European Countries, Age 15-64 
(t statistics in Parentheses) 
 CZ(Czech) PL(Poland) SK(Slovakia) HU(Hungary) # 
Gender Dummy -0.168*** 
(-3.12) 
 
-0.227*** 
(-4.65) 
 
-0.315*** 
(-7.45) 
 
-0.350*** 
(-4.66) 
 
Education 0.074*** 
(10.77) 
 
0.110*** 
(11.74) 
 
0.062*** 
(8.23) 
 
0.135*** 
(15.48) 
 
Experience 0.018*** 
(3.23) 
 
0.027*** 
(3.37) 
 
0.014* 
(1.73) 
 
0.038*** 
(4.56) 
 
Experience Sq. -0.000408*** 
(-3.36) 
 
-0.000427** 
(-2.11) 
 
-0.000245 
(-1.40) 
 
-0.000545*** 
(-2.91) 
 
Married Dummy 0.052 
(1.09) 
 
- 
 
-0.093* 
(-1.81) 
 
-0.232*** 
(-2.96) 
 
Manufacturing Dummy 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Public Dummy 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
F×M -0.119* 
(-1.82) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.154* 
(1.66) 
 
Intercept -0.111 
(-0.99) 
 
-0.847*** 
(-5.65) 
 
-0.087 
(-0.74) 
 
-0.926*** 
(-6.44) 
 
Observations 537 
 
428 
 
320 
 
420 
 
Adj.R-square 0.2631 
 
0.2568 
 
0.2811 
 
0.3775 
 
[Note] 1. Data from Year 2004; # Data from Year 2005; 
           2. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Discussion starts from the regression results of log hourly wage on the samples of aged 15-64 
paid employees in Nordic countries (Table 5-2a). Both education and experience variables 
have positive and significant coefficients in all countries, while the negative effect from the 
rate of returns to increasing experience (which can be shown in the experience quadratic term) 
on log hourly wage is almost zero. Wage is an increasing function of human capital variables, 
combined with the finding from the variable means that there is averagely higher level of 
education and more working experience among women, the women’s endowments of human 
capital actually narrow the gender wage gap in Nordic countries. Working sector variables 
indeed play key roles in explaining the gender pay gaps in all these countries though the 
picture is starkly different. Public dummy gives a great negative effect, which is around 1.5 
times as big as the effect of human capital variables, on the log hourly wage in both Norway 
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and Sweden. This is possibly due to the over-supply of female workers in public sector in 
these countries, which could drive down the pay offered by the employers in this sector, and 
in turn widen the gender pay gap as a result of the over-representation of women. The 
problem that women are crowded in public sector also exists in Finland and Iceland, but 
there’s no significant effect here. On the contrary, manufacturing dummy significantly affects 
the wages in these two countries, whilst it shows positive value in Finland and negative in 
Iceland. Workers in the manufacturing sector obtain higher remuneration in Finland but get 
penalty in terms of wage in Iceland. The reason is somewhat difficult to trace, but since only a 
very small portion of female workers stay in this sector in each country (11.36% in Finland 
and 3.88% in Iceland), it can be inferred that the magnitude of overall effect from 
manufacturing dummy on gender wage differentials is not large in both Finland and Iceland. 
Without exception, gender dummy has a significantly negative coefficient, which reveals the 
lower wages received by women in all these countries. Except in Iceland, including the 
married dummy and the interaction term strongly supports the argument of “family wage gap” 
in Nordic countries. The coefficients of married dummy are positive and the coefficients of 
the interaction term are negative in all these countries, significantly, which represent that for 
females the hourly wages are estimated to be lower among married individuals than for 
singles; however, the opposite result is shown for males.     
 
Different regression results in Eastern European countries (Table 5-2b) have been obtained, 
given the available data sets. The gender pay gap is still negatively related to the human 
capital variables in all countries, whereas the magnitude of the effect of human capital 
indicators is larger in Poland and Hungary compared to other Eastern European countries and 
all Nordic countries. Neither working sector variable suggests significant impact on wage 
level in each country, which is in accordance with the observed small difference in sectoral 
composition between men and women in Eastern Europe. Negative gender dummy 
coefficients are relatively higher than those in Nordic countries, on average, but not the case 
in Czech. Married dummy and the interaction term have not been included in the regression 
model in Poland because there is no significant difference regarding marital status, just like 
the case in Iceland; the model in Slovakia has no interaction term as well. Contrary to the 
expectation, the patterns of “family wage gap” in Czech and Hungary have diverged 
dramatically. In Czech, married women receive lower wages than singles while married men 
earn more, the same as in Finland, Norway and Sweden; in Hungary it is the other way round 
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--married women get higher wages while the estimated hourly wages for men are substantially 
lower for married individuals than for single individuals8.          
5.3 Gender Pay Gap Analysis 
 
Obviously, gender pay gaps exist in all these countries with different magnitude and 
components for various reasons. The following part will focus on the comparison and 
decompositions of gender pay gaps to explore the different patterns and possible reasons of 
those gaps in different countries. 
 
5.3.1 Summary of Gender Pay Gap 
 
Follow the regression tests of log hourly wage for each country, gender pay gaps are 
summarized in Table 5-3a and 5-3b. 
 
Table 5-3a Gender Pay Gaps in Nordic Countries, Age 15-64 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
  FI(Finland) NO(Norway) SE(Sweden) IS(Iceland)# 
Unadjusted 
Gap 
 
0.244 
(0.028) 
0.211 
(0.024) 
0.158 
(0.020) 
0.208 
(0.064) 
Single 
Male/Female 
0.219 
(0.037) 
0.140 
(0.034) 
0.100 
(0.025) 
0.252 
(0.059) 
 
 
Adjusted Gap 
Married 
Male/Female 
0.315 
(0.031) 
0.215 
(0.028) 
0.217 
(0.026) 
0.252 
(0.059) 
[Note]  1. Data from Year 2004; # Data from Year 2005; 
            2. Unadjusted gender pay gap is defined as the difference in mean log hourly wage between male and                    
female work force; 
            3. Adjusted gap is the gender pay gap taking into account the differences in male and female work force 
regarding the individual characteristics and working sectors; 
            4. Except in IS, there is significant difference in the gap between single male and female and that between 
married male and female in each country. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8
 Perhaps it is because the large amount of missing data of wages for married women in Hungary and therefore 
leads to a huge difference in married proportion between male and female paid employees. 
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Table 5-3b Gender Pay Gaps in Eastern European Countries, Age 15-64 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
  CZ(Czech) PL(Poland) SK(Slovakia) HU(Hungary)# 
Unadjusted 
Gap 
 
0.227 
(0.034) 
0.110 
(0.055) 
0.313 
(0.046) 
0.161 
(0.055) 
Single 
Male/Female 
0.168 
(0.054) 
0.227 
(0.049) 
0.315 
(0.042) 
0.350 
(0.075) 
 
 
Adjusted Gap 
Married 
Male/Female 
0.286 
(0.037) 
0.227 
(0.049) 
0.315 
(0.042) 
0.195 
(0.056) 
[Note]  1. Data from Year 2004; # Data from Year 2005; 
            2. Unadjusted gender pay gap is defined as the difference in mean log hourly wage between male and                     
female work force; 
            3. Adjusted gap is the gender pay gap taking into account the differences in male and female work force 
regarding the individual characteristics and working sectors; 
            4. Except in PL and SK, there is significant difference in the gap between single male and female and that 
between married male and female in each country. 
 
 
 
As reported in the tables above, the unadjusted gender pay gaps are almost on the similar level 
in Nordic countries and Eastern European countries, which is around 0.2 log points; except in 
Poland the raw gap (only 0.11 log points) is slightly smaller and in Slovakia the gap is 
relatively larger (over 0.3 log points).  
 
After controlling individual specific factors like human capital and marriage variables, as well 
as the working sector dummies9, more striking variations in the gender pay gaps appear in 
those countries. In most of the Nordic countries except Iceland, the pay differentials between 
single male and female significantly differ from the differentials between married male and 
female. Male-female wage gaps are relatively small for single men and women, but quite 
large for married men and women. The gender pay gap for single individuals is about 30 
percent smaller than that for married individuals in both Finland and Norway; while it is 54 
percent smaller in Sweden. Such remarkable differences can be drawn from the regression 
results that marriage tends to benefit men and disfavour women on earnings in these countries. 
Such picture can not be seen in Iceland, marriage has no important impact on gender wage 
differential. The adjusted male-female wage gap is around 0.252 log points regardless of the 
                                                
9
 In general, human capital variables have been included in regressions for each country. For other specific 
variables, I only consider the variables which have significant effects on log hourly wage for each country, as the 
results listed in Table 5-2a/5-2b. One exception is, in the regression result for Czech, the interaction term which 
is the product of gender and married dummies shows a significant effect, thus the married dummy has also been 
included without significant effect.       
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marital status, which is higher than the level in other three Nordic countries but slightly 
smaller than the adjusted gap for married men and women in Finland.  
 
In Eastern European countries, the pattern that the pay gaps are distinct between men and 
women with respect to the marital status has shown up only in Czech with a 41 percent 
smaller gap between single men and women. The totally opposite pattern exhibits in Hungary 
that the pay gap between single male and female is much wider (almost 80 percent) than the 
gap between married male and female, since marriage has a positive effect on women’s wage 
estimated in this country. The pay gaps between single male and female do not significantly 
differ from the gaps between married male and female in Poland and Slovakia, as in Iceland; 
but the adjusted pay gaps have increased in these countries compared to the unadjusted gaps, 
though they are increasing in different level. Particularly in Poland, the gender pay gap 
adjusted for human capital variables is 0.227 log points, much higher than the unadjusted one 
(0.110 log points). Even though the raw gap in Poland makes it a country with a seemingly 
small gender pay gap, the adjusted gap reveals that the female workers still face a 
considerably lower wage when the human capital endowment is taken into account.  
        
5.3.2 Comparison of Gender Pay Gaps Across Countries 
 
One of the interests of this study is to examine whether the significant difference in gender 
pay gaps exists between Nordic countries and Eastern European countries. With a high level 
of gender equality, do Nordic countries indeed have significantly smaller gender wage gaps in 
comparison with the Eastern European countries?  To compare the difference in gender pay 
gaps and to test the statistical significance of such difference, the difference between the 
gender pay gaps and t-statistic testing have been carried out between Nordic countries and 
Eastern European countries. Table 5-4 throws some light on the cross-country comparison of 
gender pay gaps. Negative numbers indicate smaller gender pay gaps in Nordic countries 
compared with Eastern European countries; positive numbers represent larger gaps in Nordic 
countries.  
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Table 5-4 Cross-country Difference in Gender Pay Gaps, Age 15-64 
(t statistics in Parentheses) 
 
IS(Iceland) ﹟
single married single married single married single/married
single 0.051(0.78) -
-0.028
(-0.44) -
-0.068
(-1.14) -
0.084
(1.05)
married - 0.029(0.60) -
-0.071
(-1.53) -
-0.069
(-1.53)
-0.034
(-0.49)
single -0.131(-1.57) -
-0.210**
(-2.55) -
-0.250***
(-3.16) -
-0.098
(-1.03)
married - 0.120*(1.87) -
0.020
(0.32) -
0.022
(0.36)
0.057
(0.70)
PL(Poland) single/married -0.008(-0.13)
0.088
(1.52)
-0.087
(-1.46)
-0.012
(-0.21)
-0.127**
(-2.31)
-0.01
(-0.18)
0.025
(0.33)
SK(Slovakia) single/married -0.096*(-1.72) 0
-0.175***
(-3.24)
-0.100**
(-1.98)
-0.215***
(-4.40)
-0.098**
(-1.98)
-0.063
(-0.87)
HU(Hungary)﹟
FI(Finland) NO(Norway) SE(Sweden)
CZ(Czech)
 
[Note] 1. Data from Year 2004; # Data from Year 2005; 
2. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively; 
3. Adjusted gender pay gaps between single male and female and between married male and female have been used   
here. 
 
From the results of cross-country comparison, it is somewhat hard to recognize a systematic 
pattern of the difference in gender pay gaps between Nordic countries and Eastern European 
countries. To sum up, the comparison results suggest three features of the difference in gender 
pay gaps. First, no significant difference in gaps exists between Iceland and all the selected 
Eastern European countries, and the same case has shown up in the comparison between 
Czech and all Nordic countries here. Then, put Iceland and Czech aside, the gender pay gaps 
between single men and women in other three Nordic countries are all smaller than those in 
other three Eastern European countries. But based on the t-statistic testing, in Sweden all these 
smaller gaps are statistically significant, in Norway the gaps are significantly smaller than 
those in Hungary and Slovakia and in Finland the gap only significantly differs from that in 
Slovakia.  Next, turn to the male-female wage gaps between married men and women, the 
smaller gaps only significantly exist between Norway and Slovakia as well as between 
Sweden and Slovakia; the pay gap between married men and women in Finland rises to the 
same high level as that in Slovakia, and overtakes the gap in Hungary. Such pattern probably 
is due to the observed evidence that the male-female wage differentials are significantly larger 
for married men and women than those for single men and women in these three Nordic 
countries.    
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The hypothesis that the gender pay gaps in Nordic countries are significantly different from 
those in Eastern European countries can not be supported by the unsystematic pattern of the 
difference in gender pay gaps in these countries; however, smaller pay gaps between single 
men and women still significantly exist in some Nordic countries compared with Eastern 
European countries while the same case can hardly be applied to married men and women.   
           
5.3.3 Decompositions of Gender Pay Gap 
 
To further explore the magnitude of components which are responsible for the gender pay 
gaps in different countries, the unadjusted pay gap between male and female in each country 
has been decomposed at the mean. The decomposition results, in which variables with 
statistically significant coefficients have been involved, are presented in Figure 5-1; more 
detailed information on the decomposition results is provided in Appendix 5.  
     
Figure 5-1  Decompositions of Gender Pay Gap 
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The figure above demonstrates the significant components of the gender pay gap in each 
country, and the size of each component. The explained components include the observed 
human capital endowments, working sector composition, and marriage status. The similarity 
is that the human capital endowments contribute to narrowing the gender pay gaps in all these 
countries, though the sizes of contribution are different from each other. As mentioned before, 
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women on average accumulating relatively higher level of human capital in these countries 
tends to narrow the gender wage differentials. The effect of marriage status is almost next to 
nothing in most of the countries, except a small negative effect in Hungary. Working sector 
dummies can be explanatory variables only in all Nordic countries; however, the explained 
portion is different. Manufacturing dummy seems to favor women in Iceland since around 10 
percent negative effect on the pay gap exists there, while it explains about 5 percent of the 
gender wage gap in Finland. Almost 20 percent of the male-female wage differentials can be 
explained by the public dummy in both Norway and Sweden, which suggests that the 
overcrowded female working sector, say public sector here, consists a  great part of gender 
pay gaps in these two countries. 
 
Apart from the explained components, unexplained factors still attribute a considerable 
portion to the gender pay gap in each country. More than 50 percent of the gender pay gap is 
due to the gender dummy in almost all countries, except in Sweden the gender dummy only 
accounts for near 40 percent. It means that women in these countries facing the inferior 
treatment in terms of wage still results from the membership in the female group, which is 
generally influenced by the discrimination against women, to a large extent. In addition, the 
interaction term between gender and married dummies shows a positive effect on the gender 
pay gap in Finland, Norway, Sweden and Czech, which well reflects that the married women 
in these countries suffer more substantial wage inferiority. On the contrary, in Hungary the 
interaction term appears a negative effect on the gender pay gap, which means married 
women are in a better situation with respect to the wage in this country.  
 
5.3.4 Gender Pay Gap and Wage Distribution 
 
One remarkable consequence of the market reform in Eastern European countries is the 
widening wage distribution. Wage-setting system changed from the centralized form to collect 
bargaining or decentralized system with the development of economic liberalization. The 
expected widening wage structure following wage decentralization emerged after the 
introduction of market reform in these countries, as it can be seen from Brainerd (2000) that 
the post-reform 90-10 log wage differential is more than 30 percent larger than the pre-reform 
level for men and around 25 percent for women in Czech and Slovakia, while around 100 
percent larger in Ukraine. On the contrary, Nordic countries have a narrower wage dispersion 
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and more compressed wage structure, compared to Eastern Europe. The summarized wage 
distribution indicators have been reported in Table 5-1 in previous discussion. 
 
As previous comparative studies suggest that a more compressed wage structure is associated 
with a lower gender pay gap (Blau and Kahn, 1996b), is this pattern suitable for Nordic 
countries and Eastern European countries as well? Given the summary of wage distribution 
(Table 5-1) and the gender pay gaps in all countries (Table 5-3a/5-3b), the correlation between 
gender pay gap and wage distribution is presented in Figure 5-2. Here only the 90-10 log 
wage differential has been used as the indicator of wage distribution to correlate with the 
gender pay gap in each country. 
 
Figure 5-2  Correlation between Gender Pay Gap and Total Wage Distribution 
 
 
 
(a)   Correlation coefficient: -0.2695 
 
(b)  Correlation coefficient: 0.8039 
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(c)  Correlation coefficient: -0.0769 
 
Given the small number of countries in this study, it is difficult to test the hypothesis that 
there is a positive correlation between wage dispersion and gender wage gap in these 
countries resorting to the available data sets here. However, Figure 5-2 still illustrates some 
characteristics of the labour market situations in Nordic countries and Eastern European 
countries.  
 
Unadjusted gender wage gap, adjusted wage gap between single male and female as well as 
the adjusted wage gap between married male and female are utilized to correlate with the 
wage dispersion level, which is measured by the total 90-10 log wage differential; and each 
correlation has been shown in the panels in Figure 5-2, separately. Only in panel (b), the 
highly positive correlation suggests that the adjusted pay gaps between single men and women 
are increasing in the level of wage dispersion in these countries; such positive relation is 
unlikely to obtain from panel (a) and panel (c). It is consistent with the previous finding in this 
study that the pay gaps between married men and women are much greater than the gaps 
between single men and women in some countries, especially in Nordic countries.  
 
An unusual phenomenon in these correlations appears in Hungary. The gender wage gap 
between single men and women is largest in Hungary, as seen from the symbol which is on 
the highest level in panel (b), since Hungary has the widest wage dispersion among the 
sample countries in these correlations; but the symbol of Hungary goes to the bottom in panel 
(c) when the pay gap between married men and women is correlated with wage distribution, 
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as a result of smaller gap between married men and women rather than between single men 
and women in Hungary.       
 
5.3.5  Investigation into Employment Rates 
 
In addition to the widening wage structure in Eastern Europe, a sharp decline of employment 
rate in the labour market has occurred in response to the market reform in these countries at 
the same time. Large employment reductions in state enterprises resulting from the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises and the liberalization of wages and prices as well as 
the incapability of off-setting the large scale reductions by the expansion of private sector, 
both strongly drove down the overall employment rates in Eastern European countries. 
Consequently, with the declines in overall employment rates in the labour market, the female 
labour force participation rates have fallen significantly in all Eastern European countries. On 
the other hand, the Nordic countries have been taken as highly gender equality countries with 
high labour force participation rates of women during the past decades. The detailed 
information on employment rates in both Nordic countries and Eastern European countries 
has been given in Appendix 6, gained from ESS2 data sets.   
 
Both the employment rates from ESS2 data sets and in OECD data for working age (15-64) 
population have been listed in Appendix 6, through which it can be observed that the 
employment rates obtained from ESS2 are close to the OECD statistics for most of the 
countries. Also, the employment rates for persons with different marital status (single or 
married in this study) have been reported separately, since there is significant difference in 
gender pay gaps with regard to different marital status for some sample countries, it is worth 
noting the difference in employment rates in terms of marital status as well.  
 
Based on the reported employment rates for all countries, it’s clear to see that Nordic 
countries have much higher employment rates on average than all the Eastern European 
countries. Focus on the female employment rates for working age population, around 40 
percent higher in Nordic countries compared to Eastern European countries. Besides, higher 
employment rates appear in Nordic countries for both single and married women. As for the 
observed employment gap between men and women, much smaller gaps exist in Nordic 
countries than those in Eastern European countries even though the gender gaps in 
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employment rates have widened greatly among married population in comparison with those 
among single population.  
 
The large decline in employment rate in Eastern Europe after market reform may exert a 
downward pressure on wages in the labour market, and also there is still an apparent lower 
female employment rates in these countries than those in Nordic countries. Is it possible to 
expect a negative effect of female employment rate on the gender pay gap to some extent? 
Can female employment rates explain some features of gender pay gaps in these countries? 
Some correlations have been employed to test the hypotheses, presented in Figure 5-3.  Again, 
the relatively small number of sample countries is difficult to give strong evidence in 
explaining the relation between female employment rates and gender pay gaps empirically, it 
may explore some findings for the comparative study of gender pay gaps in a sense. 
 
 
Figure 5-3  Correlation between Gender Pay Gap and Female Employment Rate 
 
 
 
 
(a)       Correlation coefficient: -0.3097 
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(b)       Correlation coefficient: -0.1555 
 
The correlations between the adjusted gender pay gap among single population and single 
female employment rate (panel (a)) as well as the adjusted gender pay gap among married 
population and married female employment rate (panel (b)) are shown above. It can be seen 
from Figure 5-3, although the correlations suggest that the female employment rate is unlikely 
to well explain the gender pay gap in these countries, the adjusted wage gap between single 
male and female is negatively correlated with the single female employment rate with a low 
correlation coefficient while even weaker correlation has been obtained from the relation 
between the adjusted gender pay gap among married population and married female 
employment rate. In addition, when comparing panel (a) with (b), it is obvious that the male-
female wage differentials between married men and women are greater than those between 
single men and women in some countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden and Czech) in spite of 
the higher female employment rates among married population. One exception is again 
Hungary where with higher female employment rate among married population, the wage gap 
between married men and women has become narrower. Hard to prove as it is, the situation is 
consistent with the result for Hungary that gender pay gap is smaller among married 
population, rather than the case in some other countries that married women encounter greater 
gender wage differential compared to single women.  
 
The result here is kind of puzzle against the expectation that higher female employment rate 
accompanies smaller male-female wage gap. But for those countries with higher gender pay 
gaps among married population, much higher employment gaps between men and women 
among married population in comparison with the single population perhaps make some sense 
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in explaining the larger male-female wage differential for married men and women. Because 
if the higher employment gap between married men and women is due to the declined 
incentive for labour market participation among married women (probably because of the 
division of labour in the family or child care) or the discrimination against married women 
especially married women with children, it is expectable that a higher gender gap with regard 
to employment rate leads to a larger gender pay gap. But this is hardly the case in this study, 
with reference to the correlations in Figure 5-4.           
 
Figure 5-4  Correlation between the Gender Gaps in Wage and in Employment Rate 
 
 
(a) Correlation coefficient: -0.3993 
 
 
(b)  Correlation coefficient: 0.1647 
 
 [Note]  Employment gap is given by the difference between the male employment rate and female                         
employment rate with regard to marital status; all employment rates have been reported in Appendix 6a/6b.            
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6.  Underlying Reasons for Empirical Findings 
 
Though there is a mixed picture with respect to gender pay gaps in Nordic countries and 
Eastern European countries, some different characteristics still stand out and lead up to 
pursuing the study for underlying reasons. This section covers the explanation of factors 
contributing to the gender pay gaps in different countries as well as the related policies and 
economic situations. 
6.1 Family, Work and Pay Gap 
 
One remarkable characteristic of gender pay gaps in previous analysis is that the pay gap 
between married men and women is significantly larger than that between single men and 
women in some countries, especially in most of the Nordic countries. This finding is in accord 
with the results of other researches on family wage gap, thus leads to considering about the 
effects of family policies and women’s choices between work and family on the gender pay 
gaps in Nordic countries and Eastern European countries. 
 
Box 1. Family-friendly Policies in Selected Nordic Countries 
Finland 
- The Finnish leave period is 54 weeks with the first 20 weeks for the mother, then 32 weeks 
of parental leave10 and further, a father’s quota of 2 weeks. However, fathers have to take at 
least two weeks of parental leave in order to earn the two weeks of paternal leave.  
- The compensation rate is 66% for most of the period, while 70% of the average wage level 
has been implemented since 2005. 
- A subsidy for child care at home has existed up until the child is aged 3; the coverage of 
publicly provided child care is lowest among all Nordic countries. 
 
Iceland 
- The maternity leave has been 6 months since 1987. By 2000, 3 months leave was allotted for 
mother and a 3 months parental leave period could be used by either parent. The father’s 
quota increased to 3 months in 2003.  
- For most of the leave period, the compensation rate is 80% of former wage income up to a 
maximum.  
- High coverage of public child day care is provided in Iceland, for children aged 3-5 the 
coverage was 93% in 2002. 
                                                
10
 Parental leave is defined as the leave period which is transferable between the father and mother; maternal 
leave is defined as a leave period that is reserved for the mother; paternal leave means a leave period that is 
reserved for the father, or say, father’s quota.  
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Norway 
- The parental leave period was extended to 52 weeks in 2005. Except for the mother’s quota 
of 9 weeks and the father’s quota of 4 weeks, the rest is open for both parents.  
- The mother and father should be employed for at least six months during the last ten months 
before the birth to be entitled to payment during parental leave. The parents are compensated 
100% of their former wage income for a period of 40 weeks or 80% for a period of 52 weeks. 
- Around 82% of all children age 3-5 were provided public child care in 2002, while the 
coverage was relatively low for children aged 0-2.  
- All families with children aged 13-36 months, who do not have a governmentally subsidized 
child care arrangement, may receive a cash for childcare benefit amounting to Euro 400 per 
month. In addition all children receive a child benefit around Euro 130 per month. 
 
Sweden 
- The parental leave period is 16 month totally, among which 13 months can be shared 
between mother and father without restriction while one month is reserved for mother and in 
2002 the father’s quota was extended to two months. 
- The compensation rate for most of the leave period is 80% of former wage income up to a 
maximum, though a 90% compensation rate exists in the case of all state and government 
employees in the public sector. The compensation rate is based on the former annual income. 
- The coverage of publicly provided child care is not low except for the age group 0-1; while 
the staff-to-child ratio is typically 1:6 for preschool children, which is much lower than the 
average ratio in other OECD countries.  
Source: Barth  et al. (2002); Datta Gupta et al. (2006). 
              
Nordic countries led on most of the family-friendly policy indices across OECD countries 
(OECD, 2001); at the same time, these countries have succeeded in maintaining a high rate of 
female labor force participation without reducing fertility to the low levels (Datta Gupta et al., 
2006) thanks to the generous family-friendly policies (see Box 1).  
 
Despite the fact that large differences with regard to the detailed family policies do exist 
among Nordic countries, considerably generous family-friendly policies are applied in Nordic 
countries such as long leave periods for child-rearing, high compensation rates during leave 
periods, high flexibility of the leave schemes, large investments in publicly provided child 
care to improve the coverage and quality of child care and so on. Such kind of policies has 
been proved that to some extent they have positive effects on women’s participation in the 
labor market and on children’s development, by some studies (e.g. Jaumotte, 2004; Datta 
Gupta et al., 2006); while certain effects on women’s position in the labor market and the 
choices for women to balance work and family should also be considered. Although the data 
for child number or fertility rate is not available in this study, the gender pay gaps between 
married men and women and those between single men and women do make some sense 
when family policies and family wage gaps are taken into account.  
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Based on the flexibility of take-up the leave schemes in Nordic countries and less than 100% 
offer of compensation rates during leave periods, generally most of the parental leave is taken 
up by mothers (Datta Gupta et.al., 2006). This is because the economic incentives spur on the 
parent with lower earnings to take up most of the parental leave, and since men tend to earn 
higher income than women, thus mothers are likely to take large proportion of the parental 
leave in these countries. Formal rights to leave make it easier to keep a formal attachment to 
previous job and employer, which is important for parents, especially for mothers (since most 
of the parental leave periods are taken by mothers in these countries) to take time for 
childbirth and childrearing without getting out of labor market. At the same time, the 
publicly provided child care with a fairly low price and high quality (see the extensive surveys 
in OECD 2002b, 2003, 2004, 2005) can possibly support mothers to return to their previous 
jobs without anxiety. On the other hand, negative effects may come from long periods of 
maternity leave (parental leave). Though those mothers who have formal rights with job-
protection are high likely to resume previous employment, the leave schemes with high 
compensation rate and long period allow mothers to take considerable time out of work, 
which have a negative labor supply effects(Datta Gupta et. al., 2006). Also, long leave periods 
directly imply career interruptions, which can be expected to have negative effects on 
women’s human capital accumulation during break. This is because mothers may experience a 
stagnation period of accumulating education or working experience during parental leave 
periods and competitive labor market and continuously updated knowledge may impede 
mothers to adapt to the new working environment easily when they return to previous jobs. 
Thus negative effects of long leave periods on women’s position in the labor market and 
therefore relative wages are likely to exist in these countries to some extent, which can partly 
explain why the male-female wage differentials between married men and women are 
significantly larger than the differentials between single men and women in most of the 
Nordic countries.         
 
Box 2. Family Support Systems in Selected Eastern European Countries 
Czech Republic 
- Maternity leave period is 6 weeks prior to confinement and 22 weeks after confinement. The 
compensation rate is 69% with a maximum. 
- Parental allowance or social allowance is paid for low income families with children, by 
using income-tested approach to decide the entitlement.  
- Child benefit up to age 15 (26 for student) is paid to low-income families, earnings-related 
benefit formula is applied as well. 
- Enrolment rate of nursery have dropped significantly since the transition to a market 
economy, while kindergarten participation rate is nearly as high as before the transition. 
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Monthly fee for public kindergarten was around 2-5% of average wages in 1998, and some 
special support for low-income families or families with more than one child in day care are 
provided by government. 
 
Hungary 
- 4 weeks before confinement and 20 weeks after, for maternity leave. 70% of last wage is 
compensated for leaving.  
- Child care fee is paid until the child turns 2 related to earnings, which is 70% of last wage up 
to an annual maximum of Euro 318.44. Child raising support is universal for parents who 
raise three or more children in their own home, if the youngest child is between 3 and 8.   
- Family allowance is applied universally up to child turns 16 (20 for student), the allowance 
is increasing with number of children in the family and higher for single parent. Euro 14.57 
per month is paid for one child in the family and Euro 17.26 is for single parent with one 
child. 
- Enrolment rates of nursery and kindergarten are both the same level as pre-reform, with 10% 
in nursery and 85% in kindergarten in 1997.   
 
Poland 
- Maternity leave period is from 16 weeks for the first single birth to 18 weeks for the next 
single birth, and 26 weeks in case of multiple birth. 100% of last wage is paid for 
compensation during leave period.  
- Based on income-tested approach, only low-income families are qualified to receive child 
raising allowance, which is paid for 24 months for single child and 36 months if raising more 
than one child or if a single parent. The allowance uses a flat rate, which is Euro 69.44 per 
month and Euro 110.41 for single parent. 
- Family allowance is available for low-income families up to child turns age 16 (20 for 
student), which is increasing from the third child in the family. Euro 9.26 is paid monthly for 
the first and second child in low-income family.  
- Both nursery and kindergarten participation rates were relatively low, which were around 
5% in nursery and 50% in kindergarten in 1997. 
 
Slovakia 
- 4-6 weeks before and 24-22 weeks after confinement for maternity leave, while 37 weeks for 
multiple birth or single mothers. Compensation rate is 90%. 
- Parental leave allowance is only available for low-income and full-time parental care 
families, which is Euro 65.85 per month and paid up to child is 3.  
- Child allowance is paid up to age 15 (25 for student) to low-income families; earnings- 
related benefit formula is applied and the amount of allowance is rising with the age of child. 
 
Source: Rostgaard (2004). 
 
Transition economies have experienced changes not only in market and economic situation, 
but also in demographic landscape. The number of children has dropped significantly in most 
of these countries since 1989, which is argued by some analysts that the great decline in 
fertility rate in these countries is a consequence of the harsh economic and social conditions 
the countries have faced during transition (Rostgaard, 2004). As mentioned by Sobotka (2001), 
the trend in the four Eastern European countries which are listed in Box 2 can be seen as 
resulting from a more stable environment (compared with the former Soviet Union) in which 
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two groups of women can be distinguished: those acting traditionally by marrying and having 
children early, and those who postpone birth and are less willing to follow the two-child 
family norm. These economies have also experienced considerably falls in employment since 
the introduction of market reform and the falls have especially affected women in labor 
market. As it can be seen from Appendix 6b, only around half of female working-age 
population are employed in the labor market nowadays with the lowest in Poland at 46.4% in 
2004 (according to OECD data in Appendix 6b). The reason for low labor market 
employment rate is partly due to economic pressure and privatization of state-owned 
enterprises.  
 
Family support system is an important policy tool that helps families and children to improve 
their quality of life as well as to enable both parents to take time off for child-caring and to 
balance work and family life. The family support policies used to be very generous in relation 
to family allowances and early childhood care and education services under the centrally 
planned economy; while those policies have tended to be less generous since market reform 
was implemented in these countries, i.e. reduced family allowances as the result of fiscal crisis 
brought on by the transition, and significantly dropped enrolment rates of pre-school child day 
care services. Although Eastern European countries tend to follow the established patterns of 
family support system, the concrete family policies vary across countries (see Box 2).  
 
The coexistence of generous family support policies favoring mothers like the relatively long 
maternity leave periods, high compensation rate (considerably high rate with 100% in Poland 
and 90% in Slovakia), no corresponding generous policy available for fathers, income testing 
approach used for selection of families who are eligible to receive parental benefit (except in 
Hungary) and benefit provided until the child is 2-3 years old and the economic pressure and 
depressing female employment rate in the labor market in these countries leads to two 
strategies for women to make decisions between work and family. One is the “one-earner, 
two-parent family” (Rostgaard, 2004) pattern  with the mother staying at home to take care of 
children and the father entering labor market to earn money to support the family, since 
women tend to suffer more severe employment pressure and earn less in the labor market. The 
other is that women keep staying in employment with postponing the childbearing or those 
mothers who go back to work after child birth as soon as possible in order to protect their 
previous jobs by giving up their entitled maternity leave. These two strategies may partly 
explain the finding in this study why in some Eastern European countries (e.g. Poland and 
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Slovakia), there’s no significant difference in gender pay gaps between single population and 
married population. Since some married women with child enjoy the generous family policies 
and become inactive in labor market while the others stay in employment to pursue their 
career, it can be expected that the gender pay gaps in these countries may be not significantly 
different with regard to marital status.  
 
Another important family policy which is also related to gender wage gap is the provision of 
early childhood care and education services (hereinafter “ECCE”) programs. The typical 
ECCE programs in communist regimes would initially appear very similar to the Nordic 
approach (Rostgaard, 2004). But with the transition to the market economy, the enrolment 
rates have dropped in both nurseries and kindergartens in most of the Eastern European 
countries. Such drop can be explained in this way: the rising in unemployment makes many 
parents think it’s unnecessary to use day care since they can take care of the child at home; 
besides, relatively high expenditure on childcare incurs lower demand to use day care since 
many families especially low-income families can not afford the high enrolment fees. The 
recent situation of ECCE programs in Czech can explain why the gender pay gap between 
single men and women is significantly narrower than the gap between married men and 
women in this country (just the case in most of the Nordic countries) to some extent. Except 
the low enrolment rate in nursery (only about 1% in 1997), the fairly high kindergarten 
participation rate (around 85% in 1997) as well as the relatively low enrolment fee for public 
kindergartens (2-5% of monthly average wage in 1998) may reflect that publicly provided 
child care is still a better choice than child care at home in Czech.11 Apart from ECCE, there 
is a fact in this country where 23% of available maternity days are not used (UNICEF, 1999). 
As discussed before, this observed fact partly reflects the trend that some mothers refrain from 
using the maternity leave and are willing to go back to work as soon as possible in order to 
protect their jobs since they face a labor market with low employment rate and great 
competition; also the relatively low compensation rate during leave period compared to other 
Eastern European countries may give incentives to women to choose resume their career as 
soon as possible in order to have better financial support for the family. In spite of the fact that 
low employment rate still persists, a fairly large portion of mothers go back to labor market 
after relatively short interruptions in Czech. This situation perhaps partly explains the 
difference in gender pay gaps with respect to marital status in this country since non-mother 
                                                
11
 Here, the enrolment rate, participation rate and enrolment fee can be obtained from Rostgaard  (2004).   
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female labor force with no small portion is also staying in employment and lower wage for 
married women compared to single women may be due to some loss of human capital during 
career interruptions or more discrimination against married women or mothers. 
6.2 Gender Segregation 
 
Labor markets in Nordic countries are among the most gender-segmented labor markets in the 
world (OECD, 2002). In this study it is clear to see that in all Nordic countries more than half 
of the female work force is employed in the public sector, while only 16-22 percent of the 
male work force is there; this is not the case for the labor markets in Eastern Europe, where 
around 30 percent of the female work force stays in the public sector and the proportion of the 
female workers in the manufacturing is similar to that of the male workers. As a result, gender 
segregation by working sector becomes an important explanatory factor in the observed 
gender pay gaps in Nordic countries, especially when working in the public sector accounts 
for almost 20 percent of the gender pay gaps in both Norway and Sweden; whereas there’s no 
significant effect of working sector on gender pay gaps in all selected Eastern European 
countries in this study. 
 
Why over-representation of female work force in the public sector could be a serious case in 
Nordic countries? And how does such gender-segmented labor market affect the male-female 
wage differential? One explanation for the female-dominated public sector is self-selection of 
women, see Datta Gupta et al. (2006). As mentioned before, very generous family-friendly 
policies have been implemented in all Nordic countries, and generally the working conditions 
in the public sector have been much more family-friendly than in the private sector with 
respect to the rights to part time employment, child-care days etc, see Rosholm and Smith 
(1996). Provided with this kind of welfare state, Scandinavian women prefer being employed 
in the public sector to access to better family-friendly scheme and devote more time and 
energy to family life since woman is usually regarded as the person who is mainly responsible 
for the home and non-market activities in comparison with man. Apart from those women 
with families attracted by the public sector, a number of men or non-mothers also tend to enter 
the public sector to pursue their career. One important factor is that the public sector to a large 
extent has a monopoly power as the only potential employer for a large fraction of the labor 
force in the Nordic countries (Datta Gupta et al., 2006). 
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Given the over-crowded public sector in Nordic countries, it’s obvious that the relative wage 
in this sector tends to be lower, and therefore it partly contributes to the gender pay gap. 
Theoretically, when a large proportion of the population selects to serve in the public sector, 
the labor supply which is greater than the labor demand will drive down the wage rate and 
employers in the public sector are willing to pay lower wage facing the over-supplied market. 
And the monopsonistic power of the public sector in Nordic countries combined with unions’ 
preferences for working conditions improvements at the expense of wage increases, general 
macroeconomic conditions, tight public budgets etc (see Datta Gupta et al., 2006) may also 
explain the relatively low wage in public sector. Consequently, gender segregation by 
working sector becomes one of the main explanatory factors in gender pay gaps in Nordic 
countries since the lower wage in the public sector mainly influences the women’s income 
due to the over-represented female work force in this sector. Other previous studies (e.g. Datta 
Gupta et al., 2006) suggest the combination of generous family-friendly schemes mainly in 
the public sector and high public sector employment in all Nordic countries may have led to 
the re-emergence of a new type of male breadwinner society where mothers (women) enter 
the relatively low paid public sector to obtain more opportunities for family caring while 
fathers (men) are mainly employed in the private sector in order to have high income to 
support family. Such pattern may explain why most of the Nordic countries are experiencing 
the process of stagnation in gender pay gaps though they possess a compressed wage structure 
and expanding family-friendly policies. 
 
On the contrary, the problem of gender segregation by working sector does not show up in the 
analysis of gender wage gap for Eastern European countries although the proportion of the 
female work force in the public sector is more than twice as much as that of the male work 
force in these countries according to the data sets in this study.    
 
Before the market reform, the majority of the population was employed in state-owned 
enterprises in Eastern Europe. When market reform was launched and these Eastern European 
countries embarked on a process of economic transition, large economic and social costs 
following the structural adjustment reforms led to a sharp reduction of income of the 
population and the domestic demand. With the development of competitive market, the 
difficulties for large state-owned enterprises in adjusting to the new market conditions and the 
lack of competitiveness, coupled with the widespread economic recession, resulted in the 
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large-scale closure of those non-competitive state-owned enterprises and further the large 
employment reductions in state enterprises in all these Eastern European countries.  
 
At the same time, a giant process of privatization involved in the transition to a market 
economy fostered the rapid development of the new private businesses in a wide variety of 
economic activities and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. As a consequence, the 
difficult position of many state-owned enterprises together with the successful process of 
privatization and restructuring led to the reallocation of employment across different branches 
of the economies in Eastern Europe. The expansion of private sector has played a salient role 
in absorbing a vast amount of labor force since the implementation of market reform in spite 
of the fact that the overall employment rates in these Eastern European countries are still low 
today, especially where the female employment rates are only around 50 percent or even 
lower than 50 percent. The nation-wide employment reduction since the introduction of 
reform can be explained by the fact that the large job creation in the private sector has been 
outweighed by the great decline in the public sector. 
 
With the fact that in the Eastern European countries a large proportion of work force is 
employed in the private sector and the private sector seems expanding and more competitive, 
no over-supplied labor force or monopsonistic power can drive down the relative wages in 
these sectors. It perhaps demonstrates the finding in this study that the public sector is not a 
significant contributor to the gender pay gaps in all these Eastern European countries.  
 
However, it is noteworthy that sectoral and occupational segregation still account for the wage 
gap in Eastern Europe, which has been proved by other research. As suggested by Fodor É 
(2005), the patterns of sectoral segregation are similar in Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland—For one thing, great gender wage gaps exist in the financial sector in the three 
countries, e.g. in Hungary, around 70% of women worked in banking and financial services in 
2000 but the female-male wage ratio was less than 60%, which is the same situation in the 
Czech Republic and Poland. For another, wage differences are smallest in those sectors and 
occupations that are most segregated in these three countries. In public administration or 
education, for example, where the staffs are predominantly women, the gap is 15-20 percent; 
in agriculture, which is predominantly male, it is only 12 percent. 
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6.3 Gender Discrimination 
 
Unexplained components still account for the gender pay gaps considerably, which have been 
found in this study of all the sample countries. As reported before, the patterns are mixed and 
somewhat complicated. The unexplained factor due to being a member of female group 
accounts for more than 60 percent of the gender pay gaps in the Eastern European countries, 
and less in the Nordic countries except in Iceland. Another unexplained factor is the 
membership in the married female group, which generally accounts for about 20 percent in the 
Nordic countries excluding Iceland while more than 25 percent in Czech. It is worth 
considering the unexplained factors given such fairly great sizes in accounting for the gender 
pay gaps here. Although such factors are owing to various reasons other than discrimination, 
in this study only discrimination will be briefly discussed on account of data limitation.  
 
Statistical discrimination theory points out that statistical discrimination occurs when an 
individual is judged based on the general characteristics of the group which he belongs rather 
than upon his own characteristics (see Mcconnell et al., 2003). This type of discrimination is 
possibly implied in the labor market in Nordic countries. The previous research conducted by 
Datta Gupta and Smith (2002) shows that despite there not being a permanent effect of career 
interruptions on the family pay gap, there is a tendency that all women seem to have flatter 
wage profiles during the child bearing ages when controlling for observable factors. These 
findings perhaps reflect that given the generous family policies and the fact that mothers take 
up almost all of the total parental leave periods, the negative effect of parental leave policies 
on all women’s relative wages may exist in Nordic countries. Such negative effect possibly 
comes from the employers’ statistical discrimination against all women around the child 
bearing ages, despite of the fact that some women may plan to postpone childbearing or only 
take small portion of parental leave period. Such discrimination is practiced on the basis of the 
average features of the mothers’ group irrespective of the personal preference and behavior 
which may be differ from the average, and finally penalizes all women in terms of their wages. 
 
Becker’s taste-for-discrimination model envisions discrimination as a preference or “taste” for 
which the discriminator is willing to pay (see Mcconnell et al., 2003). As mentioned before, 
one of the important implications of Becker’s model is that such kind of discrimination may 
tend to diminish in a competitive market because the firms who practice this type of 
discrimination will suffer higher wage costs than other non-discriminating firms therefore 
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drop out of the competitive market. In the case of the Eastern European countries, economic 
reforms have spurred the development of privatization process and in turn have led to the 
more competitive markets. The taste-for-discrimination may be hard to be adopted in these 
countries after reform. For one thing, this type of discrimination against women directly 
becomes too costly for enterprises facing the more and more competitive markets as well as 
the pressure from budget constraints. For another, changing into competitive markets is highly 
likely to lead the market valuations of labor skills to be more effective, which possibly favor 
women rather than men since in these Eastern European countries women on average are 
more highly educated and more experienced than men. As a consequence, the market reform 
which has been launched in Eastern Europe may decrease the taste-for-discrimination against 
women from firms and result in narrowing the gender wage gaps in terms of the increasing 
return to human capital indicators in the competitive market.  By using standard Oaxaca 
decomposition, Jolliffe and Campos (2004) found that from 1986 to 1998 in Hungary, the 
male-female difference in log wage declined  by an amount of 0.12 and almost this entire 
decline can be explained by the drop in the unexplained or “discrimination” component 
(which declined by 0.11) of the Oaxaca decomposition.   
 
Some hints can be obtained from the family support schemes in Eastern European countries. 
First, there is no formal leave period for fathers in the selected countries, which implies 
mothers are regarded as the main persons to take the responsibility for childcare. Next, with 
the pressure on the labor market, say low employment rates in all these countries, improving 
family-support policies generally favor mothers more than fathers, which seems to encourage 
women to stay at home rather than actively participate in the labor market. Finally, some 
countries re-introduced elements of pro-natalist12 policies, e.g. the family support schemes in 
both Poland and Hungary award greater benefits to larger families, which imply the return to 
the tradition that women are viewed as housewives. Following these hints, statistical 
discrimination perhaps occurs in Eastern European countries as well. With the rapid 
emergence of the private sector in these countries, employers increasingly associate the 
employment of women with increased labor costs and discrimination against women in 
employment (UNICEF, 1999) if they apply the characteristic that women tend to take long 
time of leave due to family responsibility to the overall female group.  
                                                
12
 Natalism is the belief in the virtues of the high birth-rate. The sharp decline in fertility rates since the end of 
1980s as well as the pressure from religious groups and conservative parties led some governments of Eastern 
European countries to re-introduce the pro-natalist principle into their policies in order to encourage population 
growth (see Siim, 2000; Rostgaard, 2004). 
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Another possible source of discrimination against women in Eastern Europe is the attitude of 
the society. As the National Action Plan for Czech Republic (2004) suggested, although the 
legal system of the Czech Republic ensuring the equality between men and women has been 
established for several years, a persistent problem in this country that the stereotype in the 
attitude of the society to the role of men and women still exists. And this fundamental 
problem in Czech society often extends to the labor-legal sphere, thus creates the conditions 
for discriminatory behavior of employers on the labor market. The research performed by the 
Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Science for the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
has shown that in Czech, 40 percent of women have experienced discrimination in 
employment and about half of them on grounds of gender (see the National Action Plan for 
Czech Republic, 2004).  Analytically, such discrimination in the labor market can be expected 
to widen the gender pay gaps as well.         
 
  
46
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
With the aid of ESS2 data sets this thesis studies the recent gender pay gaps in the selected 
Nordic countries and Eastern European countries. This study tests the arguments that the 
gender pay gaps in Nordic countries significantly differ from the gaps in Eastern European 
countries and that the gender wage differentials positively correlate with the wage 
distributions while negatively correlate with the female employment rates in the labor markets 
in these countries. Yet, the results reported above indicate that no clear evidence can strongly 
support the arguments, but some different characteristics which are related with gender pay 
gaps do exist in Nordic countries and Eastern European countries.  
 
In retrospect, it appears that the negative effects of family-friendly policies and over-
representation of female work force in the public sector on female wages seem to stand out in 
the Nordic countries; while in the selected Eastern European countries such effects haven’t 
shown up remarkably. Although the generous family-friendly policies in Nordic countries 
have encouraged women’s entrance into the labor market, they can perhaps reduce the 
women’s value and attractiveness as employees since human capital accumulation and job-
attachment may be demoted by providing flexible and long-period parental leave schemes. 
The male-female wage differentials for single men and women have been found relatively 
small in some of the Nordic countries; however, the pay gaps between married men and 
women are not so narrow as expected given the finding of gender pay gaps in Nordic 
countries. Besides, the negative effect of over-crowded public sector on women’s relative 
wages has significantly widened the gender pay gaps in Nordic countries, which has been 
shown in this study.  
 
Having experienced the market reforms, the Eastern European countries have also undergone 
great changes in the labor markets apart from the variant economic and social systems. The 
private sector has developed rapidly instead of the public sector, which has absorbed a large 
proportion of labor force. Female employment rates are quite low compared with the pre-
reform labor markets, though around 30 percent of women stay in the public sector, there is 
no significant effect of working sector in terms of the manufacturing and public sectors on 
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wages in all these countries. Relatively generous family support policies have been provided 
in Eastern Europe, in which income-testing approach and pro-natalism principle have been 
involved in some countries. The purpose of such family policies is mainly to encourage 
women to stay at home to deal with family work and spur the population growth rather than 
enabling women to combine market work with family life and encouraging women to 
participate in the labor market facing the pressure on the labor market. Given this condition, it 
can be expected that women in Eastern Europe can be divided into two types: one is 
traditional type with family work as main task and men is the only earner in the family, the 
other is those women who take market work as main task and may give up enjoying the 
family support policies, and therefore stay employed in the labor market. Thus, the pattern has 
shown up in Nordic countries that the male-female wage differentials for married men and 
women are greater than those for single men and women can not be obtained in the selected 
Eastern European countries except in Czech. Market reform has brought a more competitive 
market in Eastern Europe, which may improve the market valuation on labor skills and in turn 
favor the employed women in terms of wage since on average women have higher education 
level and more experience than men in these countries. 
 
Based on the characteristics in the labor markets discussed above, some significant difference 
in gender pay gaps between the selected Nordic countries and Eastern European countries has 
been found in this study. Even though the pay gaps between single men and women in some 
Nordic countries do significantly smaller than those in some Eastern European countries, the 
similar pattern has hardly shown up in most of the countries when the pay gaps between 
married men and women are being observed. That is, there is no systematic pattern of 
significant difference in gender pay gaps between Nordic countries as a group and the group 
of Eastern European countries. On the other hand, the gender wage gaps negatively 
correlating with the female employment rates has not been strongly proved in this study, 
although the female employment rates in Nordic countries are much higher than those in 
Eastern Europe nowadays. These results are also in accord with the previous findings that 
most of the Nordic countries remain the low gender pay gaps for a long history but have 
experienced the process of stagnation in the gender wage gaps since the late 1970s (see Datta 
Gupta et al., 2006); while in Eastern Europe, the gender wage gaps were in the relatively low 
level before the economic reform, and women fared better with regard to relative wages after 
reform in spite of the widened wage structures and declined female employment rates in the 
selected Eastern European countries (see Brainerd, 2000) to some extent. The relation 
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between the wage distribution and the gender wage gap has been examined in this thesis as 
well. Since Nordic countries have a very compressed wage structure and Eastern Europe has a 
widened wage structure following the decentralized wage-setting system after the 
implementation of market reform, it can be expected perhaps the more narrowing wage 
dispersions in Nordic countries are associated with lower gender pay gaps in comparison with 
the Eastern European countries, which have been suggested by other studies (e.g. see Blau and 
Kahn, 1996b). The surprising finding in this study, however, is not the same as expected—the 
positive correlation only exists between the wage distribution and the gender wage gaps 
between single men and women for these countries, which can partly be related with the 
finding that the male-female wage differentials for married men and women are much greater 
than those for single men and women in most of the Nordic countries. 
 
Apart from the observed factors, discrimination perhaps still plays a non-negligible role in the 
gender pay gaps in all these countries because of the large proportion of the unexplained 
components in the gender pay gaps which has been found in this study. It can not be testified 
on account of data limitation; however, discrimination against women, especially against 
married women in a way exists in all countries which may bring negative effects on women’s 
participation in the labor market and the relative wages. 
 
Last but not least, some limitation of this study should be pointed out here. Though the data 
sets cover all Nordic countries and many Eastern European countries, some countries like 
Denmark and Ukraine can not be used for research due to the unrecognizable data problem. 
The unusual data results of gender pay gaps in Hungary can not be explained well maybe 
because of many missing data of wages for married women in this country. These problems 
have an adverse effect on the findings to some extent. Another potential problem which is of 
limitation in this study perhaps is non-random selection with employment. If the employment 
selection is different across countries, it may affect the observed difference in gender pay gaps. 
For instance, compared to male workers, if only high quality female workers (say, tend to get 
high wages) are employed in the labor market, the pay gap between man and women in such a 
country can be expected a relatively low level. In addition, family wage gap can be 
concentrated more when comparing these two sets of countries if more variables related with 
the family structure are involved, which raises a suggestion for further research as well.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Variable Definiton
Country sample countries, identified by ISO Country Code.
Hourly Wage gross pay in a certain period in Euro divided by the contracted working hours during that period
Log Hourly Wage natural logarithm of hourly wage
Demographic
Gender Dummy if man, gender=0; if woman, gender=1
Age individual age
Married Dummy 
F× M
Human Capital
Education years of full-time education completed
Experience years of being employed in labor market
Experience Sq. a quadratic term of experience
Working Sector
Manufacturing Dummy manufacturing=1 means the individual who works in manufacturing 
Public Dummy public=1 means the individual who works in public sector
an interaction term between gender and married dummy variables, F× M=1 means a married 
woman
Appendix 1.   Summary of Variable Definition
marital status, married=1 includes legally married or in a civil partnership; married=0 includes 
never get married or divorced or widowed, so on
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Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Demographics
     Age 47,009 47,030 46,459 47,979 45,300 45,885 46,414 47.870 43,224 43,779
(17,689) (18,052) (18,158) (19,033) (17,369) (17,234) (18,588) (19.341) (17,565) (18,225)
     Married  % 58,01 53,92 54,85 47,49 55,25 54,32 44,57 43,55 53,56 52,04
Human Capital
     Education 13,465 13,027 12,170 12,403 13,169 13,172 12,041 12.150 13,390 13,075
(3,670) (3,566) (4,084) (4,091) (3,523) (3,668) (3,492) (3.417) (4,271) (4,512)
     Experience 28,335 28,752 29,863 31,842 27,002 27,979 30,107 31.546 26,887 28,327
(17,466) (18,374) (18,724) (19,822) (17,828) (18,051) (18,646) (19.540) (17,819) (19,094)
     Experience-Sq./100 11,075 11,638 12,420 14,064 10,466 11,082 12,537 13,765 10,391 11,656
(11,094) (12,480) (12,744) (14,096) (11,624) (12,120) (13,020) (14.159) (12,010) (13,527)
Working Sector
     Manufacturing  % 23.20 10,65 23,63 11,92 12.80 7,43 22,91 10,65 11,81 7,02
     Public  % 17,15 47,17 12,13 35,29 16,89 47,84 15,42 45,55 12,92 37,46
Observations 694 742 948 1,074 906 834 921 911 271 299
            2. Standard deviations are not reported for dummy variables.
[Note]   1.Data from Year 2004; ﹟ Data from Year 2005
DK(Denmark) FI(Finland) NO(Norway) SE(Sweden)
Appendix  2a.    Variable Means, Nordic Countries (Full Sample)
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Variable
IS(Iceland) ﹟
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Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Demographics
     Age 45,204 46,016 41,321 43,092 41,969 42,611 45,120 45.998 44,849 47,814
(17,539) (17,746) (17,600) (18,460) (17,672) (18,055) (18,653) (17.755) (18,008) (18,064)
     Married  % 63,07 57,02 60,71 56,82 59,59 56,14 61,39 50,45 68,93 60,38
Human Capital
     Education 12,370 12,101 11,384 11,617 12,231 11,715 11,841 11.834 11,472 11,167
(2,298) (2,323) (3,066) (3,321) (3,042) (2,897) (2,882) (3.229) (3,063) (3,242)
     Experience 28,070 28,969 26,021 28,201 25,496 26,485 29,308 29.587 28,879 32,235
(16,818) (17,772) (17,584) (18,740) (17,163) (18,024) (18,227) (18.478) (17,894) (18,578)
     Experience-Sq./100 10,705 11,548 9,858 11,460 9,442 10,258 11,907 12,164 11,537 13,840
(10,216) (11,720) (11,149) (12,502) (10,812) (12,110) (11,649) (12.256) (11,445) (13,166)
Working Sector
     Manufacturing  % 27,67 22,24 20,92 18,24 20,19 15,26 - - 14.90 11,43
     Public  % 9.50 19,18 7,84 20,74 9,15 18,94 - - 11,26 17,41
Observations 1,414 1,612 833 883 743 734 646 852 747 1,283
[Note]    1. Data from Year 2004; ﹟ Data from Year 2005
             2. Standard deviations are not reported for dummy variables.
             3. Data for working sector dummy variables is not available in Hungary.
Appendix  2b.    Variable Means, Eastern European Countries (Full Sample)
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Variable
CZ(Czech) PL(Poland) SK(Slovakia) HU(Hungary) ﹟ UA(Ukraine) ﹟
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Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Log Hourly Wage 3.198 3.045 2.728 2.484 3.112 2.901 2.759 2.600 3.089 2.881
(0.583) (0.536) (0.412) (0.357) (0.369) (0.339) (0.317) (0.271) (0.434) (0.437)
Hourly Wage 30.291 25.813 16.719 12.835 24.265 19.231 16.669 13.982 24.309 19.562
(33.139) (30.809) (7.648) (5.322) (11.717) (6.789) (6.220) (4.094) (11.236) (8.962)
Demographics
     Age 42.683 43.203 40.895 44.096 42.186 43.213 41.855 43.632 39.653 43.437
(11.183) (10.502) (11.122) (10.529) (11.848) (11.026) (11.399) (11.337) (11.905) (11.899)
     Married  % 65.00 67.85 59.23 56.30 58.96 59.64 45.39 49.63 59.57 56.31
Human Capital
     Education 14.387 14.592 13.835 14.242 14.052 14.183 12.952 13.505 14.421 14.243
(3.170) (3.142) (3.786) (3.508) (3.378) (3.325) (3.012) (2.953) (4.186) (4.062)
     Experience 21.297 21.611 20.061 22.854 22.134 23.030 21.903 23.127 19.232 23.194
(11.814) (11.245) (12.190) (12.230) (12.313) (12.142) (12.156) (12.199) (12.212) (13.405)
     Experience-Sq./100 5.926 5.931 5.506 6.715 6.412 6.775 6.272 6.833 5.174 7.159
(5.467) (5.090) (5.535) (5.818) (5.854) (5.797) (5.746) (5.732) (5.382) (6.441)
Working Sector
     Manufacturing  % 25.67 8.68 29.75 11.36 14.47 5.84 27.36 10.98 14.74 3.88
     Public  % 20.67 61.09 16.53 50.12 22.25 56.85 18.62 55.85 15.79 52.43
Observations 300 311 363 405 463 394 435 410 95 103
           2. Standard deviations are not reported for dummy variables.
[Note]  1. Data fromYear 2004; # Data from Year 2005.
Appendix  3a.    Variable Means, Nordic Countries (Paid Employees, Age 15-64)
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Variable
DK(Denmark) FI(Finland) NO(Norway) SE(Sweden) IS(Iceland) ﹟
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Variable Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Log Hourly Wage 1.018 0.791 0.815 0.705 0.799 0.486 1.087 0.927 -0.926 -1.011
(0.409) (0.368) (0.546) (0.593) (0.417) (0.386) (0.574) (0.532) (0.644) (0.701)
Hourly Wage 3.002 2.366 2.697 2.436 2.429 1.756 3.659 2.961 0.493 0.509
(1.248) (0.961) (2.216) (1.765) (1.107) (0.753) (3.424) (1.992) (0.386) (0.695)
Demographics
　　Age 41.889 41.884 37.217 39.636 40.430 40.799 37.861 40.759 39.868 41.050
(11.420) (10.334) (10.084) (10.057) (12.235) (9.995) (10.731) (11.357) (11.587) (10.092)
　　Married  % 69.14 66.98 75.43 75.03 66.67 69.40 67.16 54.88 79.32 69.29
Human Capital
　　Education 12.684 12.847 12.355 13.294 13.000 12.866 12.677 13.016 11.864 12.772
(2.151) (2.418) (2.647) (3.020) (2.986) (2.473) (2.723) (2.600) (2.090) (2.278)
　　Experience 23.205 23.037 17.862 19.342 21.430 21.933 19.184 21.743 22.003 22.278
(11.737) (10.783) (10.796) (11.146) (12.029) (9.974) (11.206) (11.965) (11.670) (10.218)
　　Experience-Sq./100 6.758 6.465 4.351 4.977 6.032 5.798 4.930 6.153 6.196 6.003
(5.409) (4.886) (4.359) (4.462) (5.375) (4.254) (4.816) (5.182) (5.151) (4.545)
Working Sector
　　Manufacturing  % 38.64 26.15 27.52 21.50 29.57 21.64 - - 18.50 13.43
　　Public  % 10.11 29.31 12.80 38.54 14.52 33.58 - - 18.29 35.08
Observations 289 248 221 207 186 134 202 219 183 255
[Note]:  1. Data fromYear 2004; #  Data from Year 2005.
            3. Data for working sector dummy variables is not available in Hungary.
            2. Standard deviations are not reported for dummy variables.
CZ(Czech) PL(Poland) SK(Slovakia) HU(Hungary) ﹟
Appendix  3b.    Variable Means, Eastern European Countries (Paid Employees, Age 15-64)
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
UA(Ukraine) ﹟
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gender Dummy -0.153***(-3.38)
-0.167***
(-3.76)
-0.143***
(-2.93)
-0.112
(-1.42)
-0.244***
(-8.80)
-0.294***
(-12.21)
-0.264***
(-10.37)
-0.209***
(-5.56)
-0.219***
(-5.90)
-0.211***
(-8.65)
-0.226***
(-10.71)
-0.185***
(-8.29)
-0.141***
(-4.15)
-0.140***
(-4.13)
-0.158***
(-7.79)
-0.195***
(-11.03)
-0.155***
(-8.30)
-0.101***
(-4.10)
-0.100***
(-4.07)
-0.208***
(-3.25)
-0.224***
(-3.75)
-0.236***
(-3.69)
-0.162*
(-1.68)
-0.252***
(-4.25)
Education 0.035***(4.62)
0.037***
(4.73)
0.037***
(4.63)
0.060***
(15.09)
0.063***
(15.53)
0.062***
(15.31)
0.061***
(15.35)
0.048***
(13.78)
0.053***
(14.81)
0.053***
(14.68)
0.053***
(14.74)
0.050***
(15.05)
0.056***
(16.35)
0.055***
(16.19)
0.055***
(16.29)
0.053***
(6.45)
0.052***
(6.19)
0.052***
(6.15)
0.048***
(6.12)
Experience 0.016**(2.08)
0.016**
(2.09)
0.016**
(2.06)
0.016***
(4.11)
0.017***
(4.41)
0.016***
(4.33)
0.016***
(4.23)
0.027***
(7.55)
0.028***
(7.97)
0.028***
(7.88)
0.028***
(7.89)
0.015***
(5.27)
0.015***
(5.50)
0.016***
(5.66)
0.016***
(5.63)
0.013
(1.49)
0.014*
(1.70)
0.013
(1.54)
0.014*
(1.70)
Experience Sq. -0.000297*(-1.75)
-0.000293*
(-1.73)
-0.000292*
(-1.72)
-0.000136
(-1.63)
-0.000146*
(-1.76)
-0.000143*
(-1.72)
-0.000140*
(-1.69)
-0.000424***
(-5.74)
-0.000434***
(-5.96)
-0.000433***
(-5.94)
-0.000433***
(-5.95)
-0.000203***
(-3.37)
-0.000186***
(-3.14)
-0.000198***
(-3.35)
-0.000195***
(-3.31)
-0.000101
(-0.56)
-0.000137
(-0.75)
-0.000118
(-0.65)
-0.000154
(-0.86)
Married Dummy 0.063(1.27)
0.063
(1.26)
0.088
(1.25)
0.051**
(2.02)
0.051**
(2.04)
0.103***
(2.83)
0.102***
(2.80)
0.018
(0.77)
0.025
(1.06)
0.061**
(1.96)
0.061**
(1.97)
0.052***
(2.78)
0.049***
(2.64)
0.107***
(4.27)
0.107***
(4.27)
-0.047
(-0.70)
-0.043
(-0.65)
0.028
(0.29) -
Manufacturing Dummy 0.033(0.52)
0.034
(0.54)
0.101***
(3.20)
0.101***
(3.19)
0.115***
(3.79)
-0.018
(-0.50)
-0.017
(-0.47) -
-0.013
(-0.55)
-0.014
(-0.59) -
-0.261**
(-2.50)
-0.264**
(-2.54)
-0.260**
(-2.53)
Public Dummy -0.045(-0.84)
-0.043
(-0.80)
-0.045
(-1.57)
-0.044
(-1.52) -
-0.126***
(-5.09)
-0.126***
(-5.10)
-0.124***
(-5.12)
-0.125***
(-5.81)
-0.121***
(-5.63)
-0.117***
(-5.70)
-0.044
(-0.64)
-0.048
(-0.71) -
F×M -0.048(-0.50)
-0.094**
(-1.96)
-0.095**
(-2.00)
-0.075*
(-1.75)
-0.075*
(-1.76)
-0.118***
(-3.42)
-0.117***
(-3.41)
-0.124
(-1.04) -
Intercept 3.198***(98.95)
2.479***
(18.07)
2.445***
(17.44)
2.439***
(17.32)
2.728***
(135.54)
1.626***
(23.25)
1.544***
(21.40)
1.529***
(21.11)
1.544***
(21.49)
3.112***
(188.16)
2.109***
(34.28)
2.040***
(32.35)
2.030***
(32.09)
2.025***
(32.38)
2.759***
(194.61)
1.893***
(34.77)
1.817***
(32.51)
1.800***
(32.26)
1.794***
(32.63)
3.089***
(66.89)
2.151***
(14.35)
2.196***
(14.55)
2.173***
(14.25)
2.253***
(15.43)
Observations 611 611 611 611 768 768 768 768 768 857 857 857 857 857 845 843 843 843 843 198 197 197 197 198
Adj. R-square 0.0167 0.0616 0.0607 0.0595 0.0907 0.3377 0.3505 0.3529 0.3518 0.0795 0.3121 0.3311 0.3328 0.3334 0.0660 0.3075 0.3339 0.3423 0.3428 0.0462 0.2161 0.2334 0.2338 0.2324
Appendix 4a.  Regression of log Hourly Wage, Nordic Countries, Age 15-64
(t  statistics in Parentheses)
NO(Norway) IS(Iceland) ﹟ SE(Sweden)FI(Finland)DK(Denmark)
           2. ***,** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively
[Note] 1. Data from Year 2004; # Data from Year 2005.
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender Dummy -0.227***(-6.73)
-0.248***
(-8.17)
-0.260***
(-8.29)
-0.181***
(-3.32)
-0.168***
(-3.12)
-0.110**
(-2.00)
-0.225***
(-4.60)
-0.225***
(-4.46)
-0.122
(-1.25)
-0.227***
(-4.65)
-0.313***
(-6.83)
-0.315***
(-7.45)
-0.322***
(-7.39)
-0.237***
(-3.16)
-0.312***
(-7.37)
-0.161***
(-2.93)
-0.250***
(-5.58)
-0.350***
(-4.66)
-0.085
(-1.30)
-0.156**
(-2.36)
-0.155**
(-2.35)
0.113
(0.84)
Education 0.075***(10.89)
0.072***
(9.85)
0.071***
(9.76)
0.074***
(10.77)
0.109***
(11.56)
0.110***
(10.91)
0.110***
(10.83)
0.110***
(11.74)
0.062***
(8.23)
0.060***
(7.72)
0.059***
(7.45)
0.061***
(8.10)
0.133***
(15.37)
0.135***
(15.48)
0.068***
(4.60)
0.070***
(4.71)
0.071***
(4.79)
Experience 0.018***(3.24)
0.018***
(3.20)
0.018***
(3.19)
0.018***
(3.23)
0.025***
(2.86)
0.025***
(2.87)
0.024***
(2.85)
0.027***
(3.37)
0.014*
(1.73)
0.014*
(1.72)
0.013*
(1.68)
0.008
(1.08)
0.037***
(4.43)
0.038***
(4.56)
0.016
(1.49)
0.016
(1.45)
0.009
(0.84)
Experience Sq. -0.000403***(-3.31)
-0.000402***
(-3.29)
-0.000407***
(-3.33)
-0.000408***
(-3.36)
-0.000375*
(-1.80)
-0.000373*
(-1.79)
-0.000377*
(-1.81)
-0.000427**
(-2.11)
-0.000245
(-1.40)
-0.000242
(-1.38)
-0.000244
(-1.40)
-0.000146
(-0.88)
-0.000536***
(-2.85)
-0.000545***
(-2.91)
-0.000383
(-1.56)
-0.000382
(-1.56)
-0.000261
(-1.05)
Married Dummy -0.007(-0.21)
-0.007
(-0.19)
0.051
(1.07)
0.052
(1.09)
0.066
(1.10)
0.066
(1.10)
0.133*
(1.64) -
-0.093*
(-1.81)
-0.098*
(-1.89)
-0.042
(-0.64) -
-0.129***
(-2.70)
-0.232***
(-2.96)
0.024
(0.31)
0.026
(0.35)
0.257**
(2.05)
Manufacturing Dummy -0.022(-0.63)
-0.020
(-0.60) -
0.039
(0.66)
0.042
(0.71) -
0.035
(0.70)
0.028
(0.57) - -
0.301***
(3.36)
0.321***
(3.59)
Public Dummy 0.048(1.11)
0.047
(1.08) -
0.004
(0.06)
0.008
(0.13) -
0.052
(0.94)
0.061
(1.09) - -
0.073
(0.96)
0.081
(1.07)
F×M -0.116*(-1.78)
-0.119*
(-1.82)
-0.136
(-1.23) -
-0.128
(-1.39) -
0.154*
(1.66)
-0.349**
(-2.28)
Intercept 1.018***(43.82)
-0.086
(-0.77)
-0.038
(-0.33)
-0.064
(-0.55)
-0.111
(-0.99)
0.815***
(21.45)
-0.853***
(-5.69)
-0.884***
(-5.50)
-0.924***
(-5.64)
-0.847***
(-5.65)
0.799***
(26.94)
-0.087
(-0.74)
-0.085
(-0.70)
-0.093
(-0.77)
-0.071
(-0.61)
1.087***
(25.44)
-0.951***
(-6.64)
-0.926***
(-6.44)
-0.926***
(-18.89)
-1.870***
(-8.99)
-1.955***
(-9.33)
-2.089***
(-9.64)
Observations 537 537 537 537 537 428 428 428 428 428 320 320 320 320 320 421 420 420 438 437 437 437
Adj. R-square 0.0763 0.2599 0.2602 0.2633 0.2631 0.0070 0.2571 0.2544 0.2553 0.2568 0.1252 0.2811 0.2790 0.2811 0.2759 0.0177 0.3749 0.3775 0.0016 0.0511 0.0712 0.0802
           2.  ***,** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
UA(Ukraine) ﹟SK(Slovakia)PL(Poland)CZ(Czech) HU(Hungary) ﹟
[Note]  1. Data from Year 2004; # Data from Year 2005;
Appendix 4b.  Regression of log Hourly Wage, Eastern European Countries, Age 15-64
(t  statistics in Parentheses)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1)+(2)+(3) (4)+(5) (6) (7) (8)
Education Experience Experience-sq. Manufacturing Public Human Capital Working Sector Married Gender F×M
FI(Finland) 0,244 -0.02483 -0.04469 0.01693 0.02115 - -0,05259 0,02115 0.00299 0.219 0.05349
NO(Norway) 0.211 -0.00694 -0.02509 0.01572 - 0.04290 -0.01631 0.04290 -0.00041 0.140 0.04473
SE(Sweden) 0.158 -0.03042 -0.01958 0.01094 - 0.04356 -0.03906 0.04356 -0.00454 0.100 0.05807
IS(Iceland) ﹟ 0,208 0.00854 -0.05547 0.03057 -0.02824 - -0,01636 -0,02824 - 0.252 -
CZ(Czech) 0,227 -0.01206 0.00302 -0.01195 - - -0.02099 - 0.00112 0.168 0.07971
PL(Poland) 0.110 -0.10329 -0.03996 0.02673 - - -0.11652 - - 0.227 -
SK(Slovakia) 0,313 0.00831 -0.00704 -0.00573 - - -0.00446 - 0.00254 0.315 -
HU(Hungary) ﹟ 0.161 -0.04577 -0.09724 0.06665 - - -0.07636 - -0.02849 0.350 -0.08452
          2. The total gender gap here is the unadjusted gap in log hourly wage
          3. All numbers are calculated based on the regression results on log hourly wage and variable means for aged 15-64 paid employees.
 Appendix  5.  Decompositions of  Gender Pay Gap 
[Note]:  1. Data from Year 2004;﹟ Data from Year 2005
Unexplained ComponentsExplained ComponentsTotal gender 
gap in log 
hourly wage
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Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
15-64 
 66.16 69.60 62.95 64.30 67.71 61.17  70.80 75.52 65.63 70.93 75.54 66.20  73.65 79.57 68.25
N 1,179 569 610 1,605 768 837 1,476 772 704 1,462 740 722 482 230 252
OECD DATA 76.0 79.9 72.0 67.2 68.8 65.5 75.6 78.4 72.7 73.5 75.0 71.8 84.4 87.4 81.2
Marital Status
Single 52.18  54.62 49.81 53.37  54.35 52.52 60.12 61.56 58.41 62.09 65.70 58.15 69.16 70.91 67.52
N 527 260 267 815 379 436 687 372 315 860 449 411 227 110 117
Married 77.69 82.20 73.61 75.57 80.72 70.57 80.08 88.47 71.47 83.78  90.69 77.27 77.51  87.29 68.70
N 650 309 341 790 389 401 788 399 389 598 290 308 249 118 131
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
15-64
 56.79 65.24 49.26 50.75 57.10 44.44 54.50 61.71 47.03 56.13 61.16 52.63 50.43 61.58 43.26
N 2,335 1,103 1,232 1,483 734 749 1,268 645 623 1,243 545 698 1,497 578 919
OECD DATA 64.2 72.4 56.0 51.9 57.4 46.4 57.0 63.2 50.9 56.9 63.1 51.0 - - -
Marital Status
Single
 41.91  44.78 39.34 34.72 38.23 30.98 39.23  42.80 35.55  47.50  47.29 47.64 42.40  46.04 40.14
N 1,003 473 530 595 302 293 520 264 256 528 222 306 573 204 369
Married 66.63 78.80 55.79 61.59 70.49 53.11 65.71 75.74 55.31 713 71.96 56.96 54.39  69.15 44.77
N 1,309 621 688 885 431 454 729 371 358 63.36 321 392 916 369 547
            2. OECD DATA source: OECD Factbook (2007), http://oberon.sourceoecd.org/vl=9633552/cl=12/nw=1/rpsv/factbook/06-01-01.htm
[Note]:  1. Data from Year 2004; ﹟ Data from Year 2005
Appendix 6b.    Employment Rates,  Eastern European Countries, Working Age 15-64
(Share of persons of working age in employment)
Marital Status
CZ(Czech) PL(Poland) SK(Slovakia) HU(Hungary) ﹟ UA(Ukraine) ﹟
Appendix 6a.   Employment Rates,  Nordic Countries,Working Age 15-64
(Share of persons of working age in employment)
DK(Denmark) FI(Finland) NO(Norway) SE(Sweden) IS(Iceland) ﹟
 
